Cooperation Mechanism of E-waste Recycling in “Internet +Recycling”Environment Based on Evolutionary Game

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0210

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the relationship of competition and cooperation between online recyclers and traditional recyclers under the “Internet +Recycling”, the evolutionary game model is constructed, and the evolutionary game process is described. The influence of relevant factors on the evolution and stability of the strategy is analyzed. The results show that the probability of choosing the cooperation strategy between the online recyclers and traditional recyclers in the “Internet +Recycling” environment is positively related to the penalties for breach of contract, the excess returns of cooperation, and negatively related to the common costs, the cost of choosing the cooperation strategy separately and the increased revenue of free-riding behavior. Respectively, the existence of the optimal excess income distribution rate and the common rate of sharing make the traditional recyclers and online recyclers most likely choose the cooperation strategy.

Key words: e-waste, recycling;“Internet +”, evolutionary game, cooperation mechanism

摘要： 基于“互联网+回收”情境,研究网络回收商和流动回收小贩在电子废弃物回收中的竞合关系,构建演化博弈模型,刻画演化博弈过程,分析相关因素对演化稳定策略走向的影响。研究结果表明,网络回收商和流动回收商小贩选择合作策略的概率与违约惩罚力度、合作后的超额收益正相关,与合作后的共同成本、单独选择合作策略付出的成本以及因搭便车行为增加的收益负相关。由于分别存在最优的超额收益分配率和共同成本分摊率,网络回收商和流动回收小贩选择合作策略的概率最大。

关键词: 电子废弃物, 回收, 互联网+, 演化博弈, 合作机理

CLC Number:

F224.32

XU Min-li, Li Sheng-lan, ZHENG Jie. Cooperation Mechanism of E-waste Recycling in “Internet +Recycling”Environment Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(9): 87-98.

许民利, 李圣兰, 郑杰. “互联网+回收”情境下基于演化博弈的电子废弃物回收合作机理研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(9): 87-98.

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