Abstract: In contemporary business environments, the phenomenon of cash flow shortages among upstream suppliers due to accounts receivable tie-up is prevalent, particularly in scenarios involving e-commerce giants such as Alibaba and JD.com. This liquidity constraint not only affects the production and operational efficiency of suppliers but also poses stock-out risks for retailers, thereby impacting the stability and development of the entire supply chain. The exacerbation of this issue is attributed to the fact that the assets of most small and medium-sized enterprises are tied up in accounts receivable, limiting their ability to leverage these assets for financing. The motivation of this study is to explore accounts receivable factoring financing as a strategic decision to alleviate supplier funding pressures, considering dynamic the demand uncertainty and bankruptcy risks within the framework of a bank-enterprise game. The core issue addressed in this research is how suppliers optimize their financing decisions through accounts receivable factoring in the supply chain environment where interactions with retailers and banks occur. Specifically, the study investigates the equilibrium decisions of banks, suppliers, and retailers in a three-party Stackelberg game, focusing on the impact of factoring financing on the expected benefits and bankruptcy risks for all parties involved. The research also examines the relationship between the actual production quantity by suppliers and the expected production quantity by banks, and how this relationship is influenced by the initial capital of suppliers. The significance of this study lies in its theoretical contributions to the field of supply chain finance, particularly in the domain of accounts receivable factoring. By constructing a comprehensive model that considers strategic interactions among banks, suppliers, and retailers, the research provides insights into optimal financing strategies that maximize expected returns while managing risks. Practical implications are equally important, as the findings guide small and medium-sized enterprises to effectively utilize their accounts receivable to alleviate financial constraints and enhance operational performance. Furthermore, the study provides a theoretical basis for banks and other financial institutions to formulate credit policies that balance risk management with profitability.
The present study employs mathematical modeling to construct a tripartite Stackelberg game model involving banks, suppliers, and retailers. This model takes into account the stochastic nature of market demand as well as the associated bankruptcy risks of suppliers and retailers. The decision of suppliers to participate in factoring financing is modeled as a response to the trade credit terms offered to retailers and the financing conditions set by banks. Parameters of the model are derived from real-world scenarios, and equilibrium outcomes are obtained through backward induction. The study also considers the impact of initial capital of suppliers on production decisions and the expectations of banks regarding the quantity of production by suppliers.
The research findings indicate that both retailers and suppliers face bankruptcy risks due to demand uncertainty, with suppliers experiencing lower risk compared to retailers. The actual production quantity of suppliers does not always align with the quantity expected by banks, and this disparity is influenced by the initial capital of suppliers. The study demonstrates that banks can influence the production decisions of suppliers and maximize their own revenue by adjusting interest rates or collateral requirements.
The application of this research can be observed in the strategic financing decisions of small and medium-sized enterprises operating within supply chains dominated by large retail giants. By understanding the dynamics of factoring financing, these suppliers can make informed decisions to optimize their cash flow while mitigating risks associated with financial constraints.

Key words: supply chain finance, accounts receivable, factoring, game theory

摘要： 上游供应商往往会面临因货款被占用而导致的资金短缺现象,这影响了供应链的稳定发展。通过构建银行-供应商-零售商的三层斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,本文研究当供应商利用应收账款保理融资时,银行、供应商和零售商的均衡决策,以及对实现各方自期望收益最大化的影响。研究表明受需求不确定性影响,零售商和供应商都会面临破产风险,但是供应商破产风险低于零售商的破产风险。另外,供应商的实际产量和银行的期望产量并不总是一致,两者关系受供应商初始资金的影响。最后,银行可以通过调整利率或质押率来约束供应商的产量决策,从而实现银行的利益最大化。

关键词: 供应链融资, 应收账款, 保理, 三方博弈