Abstract: Accompanied by the development of e-commerce, the express delivery industry has been growing rapidly, which directly drives the massive increase in the volume of express delivery business. Express packaging waste has become the main force of urban garbage increment, bringing great challenges to the ecological resources and environment. The whole society has become faced with accelerating the recovery and managing express packaging and urgently needs to solve the problem. The overall recovery rate of national express packaging waste is less than 20%. Multi-factors constrain the effectiveness of recycling, in which the consumer as a key participant in the recovery of express packaging, the implementer, which lacks the necessary incentives is an important factor in restricting the effectiveness of recycling. For consumers to participate in express packaging recycling behavior, that the government only guides the publicity is not enough, so the study of the government to develop what kind of incentives, rewards and punishments to improve consumer recycling enthusiasm is of practical significance.
   Most of the domestic and international scholars’ studies on consumers’ participation in express packaging recycling behavior have been carried out with experiments and statistical analyses. The research focuses on the government’s regulatory measures and the influencing factors that affect consumers’ recycling behavior. However, from a systematic perspective, the study of the interaction mechanism between consumer express packaging behavior and government regulatory policies is rarely involved. In the face of increasing express packaging waste and low consumer participation in express packaging recycling, in order to improve consumer participation in express packaging recycling, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government regulators and consumers under the government’s static and dynamic incentives and penalties, analyzes the stabilization strategies of the two sides of the game, and explores the impact of different government policies and measures on the consumer’s participation in express packaging recycling behavior. The study investigates the impact of different government policy measures on consumers’ participation in express packaging recycling behavior, and carries out simulation analysis. The research shows that the system has no equilibrium and stability point, and neither party has a stable strategy under the government’s static rewards and punishments; dynamic rewards and punishments can effectively promote consumers’ participation in express packaging recycling behavior, and both parties have reached an evolutionary stable state; dynamic rewards and static punishment measures have the best reward effect on consumer recycling behavior; the probability of consumers’ participation in express packaging recycling behavior is directly proportional to the government’s punishment, and inversely proportional to the upper limit of rewards, the cost of government regulation and the cost of participation in recycling.
   Therefore, based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward three countermeasure suggestions, with a view to providing reference for the government to implement different policies in response to the realistic dilemmas and specific situations of consumers’ participation in express packaging recycling, so as to effectively promote the solution of the governance problem of express packaging recycling. First, the government should adopt dynamic reward and punishment policy measures. Second, the government should innovate regulatory methods, broaden regulatory channels and reduce regulatory costs. Third, the government should establish a perfect express packaging recycling system to reduce the cost of consumer participation in express packaging recycling.

Key words: express packaging, recycling behavior, different reward and punishment measures, evolutionary game

摘要： 面对不断增加的快递包装废弃物和较低的消费者对快递包装回收的参与度,为提高消费者参与快递包装回收积极性,本文分别在政府静态及动态奖惩措施下构建政府监管部门与消费者间的演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方的稳定策略,探究政府的不同政策措施对消费者参与快递包装回收行为的影响机理,并进行仿真分析。研究表明:政府静态奖惩措施下,系统没有均衡稳定点,双方均无稳定策略;动态奖惩措施能够有效促进对消费者参与快递包装回收行为,双方均达到了演化稳定状态;动态奖励静态惩罚措施对消费者回收行为起到了最佳奖励效果;消费者参与快递包装回收行为的概率与政府的惩罚力度成正比,与奖励上限值、政府监管成本和参与回收付出成本成反比。研究结果对政府制定合理的政策措施提供参考。

关键词: 快递包装, 回收行为, 不同奖惩措施, 演化博弈