Abstract: As far as the current situation in China is concerned, there are very few enterprises with both design and construction qualifications and truly capable of undertaking EPC projects alone. In order to meet the requirements for the “Measures for the Management of General Contracting of Housing Construction and Municipal Infrastructure Projects” jointly issued by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the National Development and Reform Commission, the consortium formed by the designer and construction party has become the main form of undertaking EPC projects. In the consortium, the designer and construction party are two types of enterprises with heterogeneous dependence on different production factors. Among them, the designer belongs to the technology-intensive enterprise and the construction party belongs to the capital-intensive enterprise. When these two kinds of enterprises with heterogeneous characteristics get involved in the special organization form of association, they will inevitably have different interests due to the incompleteness of the contract and the asymmetry of information. Therefore, it has become an urgent issue for the academic community and the construction industry to explore how to realize the reasonable allocation of the control rights of EPC projects based on the heterogeneity of the two parties of the consortium, and then realize the effective unification of the interests of the consortium members, the consortium and the project in EPC projects.
   The method adopted in this study is to construct the allocation model of specific control rights and residual control rights of EPC projects on the basis of considering the heterogeneity characteristics of both parties in the consortium, and carry out theoretical derivation and hypothesis testing of the model. The details are as follows: (1)On the basis of dividing the right of control allocation of EPC projects in the whole life cycle into five stages, namely, heterogeneous feature collection stage, specific right of control allocation stage, resource investment stage Ⅰ, residual right of control allocation stage, resource investment stage Ⅱ and benefit realization stage, the control right allocation model of EPC project under the consortium formed by private sector is constructed. (2)After integrating the specific right control and residual right control into the right control allocation model, the influence of the change of its allocation interval on resource input is discussed respectively. (3)According to the solution results of the control right allocation model, structural equation model is used to further explore the strength and significance of the positive and negative correlation and positive and negative adjustment effects of the scope and heterogeneity of control right allocation on self-interest and project input.
   The results show that the identity of the leader of the alliance can restrain the self-interested investment behavior effectively; higher degree of decision preference can induce self-interested investment behavior; the increase in the allocation interval of specific control rights and the remaining control rights will stimulate the project investment of both sides of the consortium; increasing the risk tolerance and decreasing the risk preference are beneficial to reducing the self-interested investment of design units; the residual control rights of the party with higher preference should be properly controlled, but the proportion of residual control rights is still higher than that of the party with lower preference; the allocation of specific control rights and residual control rights should be adopted to minimize the self-serving input behavior of both parties, and the optimal balance between self-serving and project-oriented input should be found. The research results provide countermeasures for the rational allocation of control rights among the members of a consortium with heterogeneous characteristics.
   Considering that the Chinese scenario allows to strengthen or weaken the owner’s overall control over the project according to the characteristics of the project, future research can incorporate the influence of the owner’s strong or weak control on the control allocation of the designer and the construction party into the model. At the same time, how to effectively use the implicit incentive means of the right of control in the actual project construction and find a feasible optimal allocation of the right of control is also a problem that needs to be considered in the future research.

Key words: EPC projects, alliance, control right allocation, heterogeneous characteristics

摘要： 为确保联合体双方各自利益不受损的同时,实现项目效益最大化,EPC(Engineering-Procurement-Construction)项目控制权的合理配置成为关键。在考虑联合体双方异质性特征的基础上,构建EPC项目特定控制权与剩余控制权的配置模型,并对模型进行理论推导与假设检验。研究发现:联合体牵头者的身份能够有效抑制自利性投入行为;较高的决策偏好度会诱发自利性投入行为;特定控制权与剩余控制权配置区间的增加均会激发联合体双方的项目性投入;提高风险承受度而降低风险偏好度有利于减少设计方的自利性投入。研究成果为具有异质性特征的联合体成员间控制权的合理配置提供对策。

关键词: EPC项目, 联合体, 控制权配置, 异质性特征