Abstract: In recent years, the sharing economy has emerged increasingly, and the most representative business model is the ride-hailing platform. Due to the continued losses of profit maximization platform and the government’s concern about the development of social welfare in the ride-hailing field, the non-profit ride-hailing platform led by the government will gradually emerge in the future. Different from the traditional sharing economy research which considers the profit maximization as the goal of the ride-hailing platform, the non-profit ride-hailing platform which takes the social welfare maximization as the goal has also attracted wide attention. However, the non-profit ride-hailing platform that dispatches drivers under demand uncertainty faces the problem of how to formulate pricing strategies to improve social welfare.
   This paper constructs a decision-making model for a non-profit ride-hailing platform under two pricing strategies: static pricing and surge pricing, and comparatively analyzes the impact of different pricing strategies on the platform’s optimal price, social welfare, consumer surplus, and labor welfare. On this basis, the paper further will analyze the differential performance when the ride-hailing platform adopts surge pricing under social welfare maximization and profit maximization.
   The study finds that: (1)When there is uncertainty in service demand, the profit-maximizing ride-hailing platform choosing surge pricing will not be inferior to static pricing. (2)The social welfare of static pricing is always close to the social welfare of surge pricing in most cases. Only when demand fluctuates greatly, will online ride-hailing platforms need to consider surge pricing to better maximize social welfare. Considering the operational convenience of static pricing strategy and its easier understanding and acceptance by consumers, static pricing is a better pricing strategy choice for the non-profit ride-hailing platform. (3)The profit maximization platform’s use of surge pricing may cause supply shortages, while the social welfare maximization platform’s use of surge pricing can always match supply and demand and lead to the growth of consumer surplus. This conclusion has important guiding significance for the government to guide the pricing of urban ride-hailing services. Therefore, if the surge pricing strategy aimed at maximizing profit causes a supply shortage, it will not be conducive to realizing the basic functions of public transportation services. Moreover, although the surge pricing strategy with the goal of maximizing social welfare can promote a balanced supply and demand matching on the platform, it will also lead to a reduction in the surplus of service providers (drivers) on the ride-hailing platform, forcing the platform to increase the commission rate to “compensate” for drivers. (4)By analyzing and comparing the differences between static pricing strategies under social welfare maximization and profit maximization, the results show that the two have the same pricing when the probability of low demand is moderately low or high. When the market is always in high demand or has a moderate probability of low demand, a platform that maximizes social welfare can better match demand or improve the utility of individual consumers’ access to services, thereby increasing consumer surplus but reducing driver welfare.
   The above conclusions can provide important theoretical support and decision-making reference for governments to formulate service policy plan for the the ride-hailing platforms. For the government, the basic function of ride-hailing service is to ensure that urban residents can obtain basic commuting services at the lowest cost. Therefore, realizing the basic functional services of public transportation for online ride-hailing is often the first priority for government decision-makers. The research conclusion points out, short-term surge pricing strategy can also be adopted when facing special circumstances that cause large fluctuations in demand (such as the occurrence of large-scale events). However, when daily life needs are relatively stable, static pricing is still the preferred pricing strategy for the non-profit ride-hailing platform, both from the perspective of maximizing social welfare and the simple operation of pricing.

Key words: sharing economy, non-profit ride-hailing platform, social welfare, static pricing, surge pricing

摘要： 本文以社会福利最大化为目标,分别构建了静态定价和峰值定价两种定价策略下非营利性网约车平台的决策模型,对比分析不同定价策略对平台的最优定价、社会福利、消费者剩余和司机剩余的影响。在此基础上,进一步分析了社会福利最大化与利润最大化下网约车平台采用峰值定价时的差异表现。研究发现:(1)当存在服务需求不确定性时,利润最大化的网约车平台选择峰值定价不劣于静态定价;(2)与利润最大化为目标的网约车平台不同,社会福利最大化的非营利网约车平台除了在需求波动非常大情形下考虑使用峰值定价外,应使用静态定价;(3)利润最大化的网约车平台采用峰值定价可能造成供应短缺,而社会福利最大化的网约车平台使用峰值定价总能使得供需匹配,并带来消费者剩余的增长;(4)当出现低需求的概率适中或平台总是处于高需求时,使用静态定价的社会福利最大化的平台可以比利润最大化的平台更好地匹配供需或者使单个消费者获得更高的效用,从而具有更高的消费者福利。上述结论可为各级政府制定网约车平台服务政策方案提供重要的理论支撑和决策参考。

关键词: 共享经济, 非营利性网约车平台, 社会福利, 静态定价, 峰值定价