Abstract: Since the reform and opening up for 40 years, based on the rapid development of industrial enterprises, China’s economy has achieved a rapid take-off. However, the rough development mode at the cost of resources is now limiting the sustainable development of China’s industrial enterprises, and the previous development mode has also had a serious negative impact on China’s ecological environment. Against the background of deepening economic globalization, attracting foreign investment and strengthening synergistic cooperation between local and foreign enterprises to accelerate the process of green innovation in China’s enterprises have become an important way for solving the problem of insufficient green innovation capacity of China’s local enterprises. However, in the existing cooperation model, opportunistic behaviors have put green innovation cooperation between local and foreign firms in an awkward situation of short-termism.
Although the existing research results have a certain leading and reference role in the development of transnational green innovation cooperation, the research background of most of the current studies is mostly the general cooperation between multinational enterprises. There is a lack of research on the governance of opportunistic behaviors in transnational green innovation cooperation. Most of the studies have only added our government as a set of exogenous variables into the research model, neglecting the main role of our government in the governance of opportunistic behaviors in green innovation and lacking a systematic analysis of the governance of opportunistic behaviors in transnational green innovation cooperation among our government, local enterprises and foreign enterprises.Therefore,to solve this problem, this paper analyses the strategic choices of local enterprises, foreign enterprises and China’s government in the process of transnational green innovation cooperation by using the three-party evolutionary game model, and explores the relevant influencing factors in transnational green innovation cooperation by using simulation analysis.
The results show that the Chinese government should provide corresponding policy subsidies and tax incentives in the early stage of transnational green innovation cooperation to promote the coordinated green innovation activities of both sides. With the deepening of cooperation and consideration of cost and benefits, the Chinese government will eventually restrict the opportunistic behavior of both sides with fines. The Chinese government’s punishment measures have a positive effect on the cooperation between enterprises, and too little punishment can’t limit the opportunistic behavior. Local enterprises are more sensitive to the cost of green innovation cooperation than foreign ones. Foreign enterprises are more sensitive than local ones to the Chinese government policies and the extra benefits gained from cooperation.
Therefore, based on the above findings, this paper puts forward four countermeasure suggestions, with a view to providing reference for the Chinese government to implement different policies for the different characteristics of local and foreign enterprises, as well as the partner selection and contract signing of cooperating enterprises, so as to solve the opportunistic behaviors in transnational green innovation cooperation. First, the regulatory system for transnational green innovation cooperation activities should be improved. Second, different policies should be formulated and implemented at different periods of transnational green innovation cooperation. Then, the cost of participation in transnational green innovation cooperation by local enterprises should be appropriately lowered.Lastly, a system of “black and white lists” for transnational green innovation cooperation should be established.

Key words: international cooperation; green innovation; the Chinese government; opportunistic behavior; tripartite game

摘要： 在跨国绿色创新合作中,机会主义行为会让本土企业与外商企业之间的合作陷入短期化的尴尬境地。利用三方演化博弈模型,分析了本土企业、外商企业和我国政府在跨国绿色创新合作过程中的策略选择,并运用仿真分析探讨了跨国绿色创新合作中的相关影响因素。研究表明:我国政府应在跨国绿色创新合作的初期给予相应的政策补贴以及税收优惠等支持性政策以促进双方协同绿色创新活动的进行,随着合作的深入和对成本利益的考虑,我国政府最终会用罚金来限制双方的机会主义行为;我国政府的惩罚措施对企业间的合作具有正向作用,过少的惩罚不能限制企业的机会主义行为;本土企业对绿色创新合作中成本的敏感度大于外商企业;外商企业对我国政府政策和协同合作所获额外收益的敏感度大于本土企业。

关键词: 跨国合作, 绿色创新, 我国政府, 机会主义行为, 三方博弈