Abstract: With the development of the “stay-at-home economy” and the advancement of internet technology, people’s dining consumption habits have undergone significant changes, gradually shifting from traditional offline catering to online one, promoting the rapid development of the online catering industry and expanding market size year by year. However, the issue of food safety in online catering has become increasingly serious with the growth of the industry market size, and has become a key issue of public concern. The governance of this issue is of practical significance for improving people’s confidence in online catering consumption and promoting the good and sustainable development of the online catering industry.
Due to the fact that the issue of food safety in online catering involves multiple stakeholders such as platforms, catering merchants, and consumers, the market position and information level of different stakeholders are not completely symmetrical, resulting in differences in the governance attitudes of each stakeholder towards the issue. There is a complex intertwined relationship of interests among governance decisions of each stakeholder concerned. How to balance the interests of each stakeholder in governance of online catering food safety issues and form a multi-party governance mechanism with interest linkage, plays an important role in achieving effective governance of food safety issues in online catering.
In response to the issue of multi-party participation in the governance of online catering food safety, this paper constructs a tripartite static game model among online catering platforms, catering merchants, and consumers. By solving the expected returns of different strategy choices by various parties, analyzing the role and influencing factors of decision-making by all parties, and summarizing the necessary conditions and combination strategies for achieving effective governance of online catering food safety issues, and collecting and organizing practical cases formed by various parties under different strategic combinations as citations, this paper explores the theoretical basis and implementation mechanism for achieving multi co-governance of online catering food safety. Furthermore, it takes the Meituan takeout platform in real situations as a representative of online catering platforms, and a numerical simulation analysis is conducted using Meituan takeout platform related data to further verify the relationship among game party strategy choices.
The research results indicate that the basis for achieving long-term governance of online food safety issues through the participation of online catering platforms, catering merchants, and consumers lies in the balance of interests among participants. The necessary condition for achieving tripartite co-governance is to ensure the interests of catering merchants in compliant production. The governance of food safety in online catering can form four supervision states: strong supervision, weak supervision, inability to supervise, and optimal supervision. Different supervision states can form different governance results, and the ideal state is tripartite co-governance. From a non-ideal state, it can be transferred and transformed from controlling and adjusting influencing factor variables to the optimal governance state.
The research results promote the theoretical research of platforms’multi-party co-governance, and provide theoretical support for solving the issue of food safety in online catering, which can provide a certain reference for the governance of food safety issues in online catering in reality.

Key words: online catering, food safety, multi subject governance, static game, Nash equilibrium

摘要： 针对多方参与的网络餐饮食品安全治理问题,本文构建网络餐饮平台、商家以及消费者的三方静态博弈模型,分析各方决策的作用关系与影响因素,探究实现网络餐饮食品安全多元共治的理论基础与实现机制。研究结果表明:网络餐饮平台、商家以及消费者三方参与实现网络餐饮食品安全问题长效治理的基础在于参与者之间的利益平衡,三方共治实现的必要条件是保障商家合规生产的利益;网络餐饮食品安全治理能够形成强监督、弱监督、无法监督和最佳监督四种监督状态,不同监督状态能够形成不同治理结果,最理想状态为三方共治,从非理想状态可以通过控制和调整影响因素变量向最佳治理状态进行迁移和转变。

关键词: 网络餐饮, 食品安全, 多元共治, 静态博弈, 纳什均衡