Abstract: In the context of the current superimposed risk society and the digital age, improving emergency early warning and response, handling capabilities through digital and information technology, reducing the adverseimpact of risks, crises and disasters on society, and improving public safety performance have gradually become the direction for development in the field of safety production. The “Industrial Internet+Safety Production” Action Plan (2021—2023) clearly aims to improve the digital, networked, and intelligent level of safety production in industrial enterprises. Through the industrial Internet, the new infrastructure in the digital economy era, a new format and model of safety production will be built.
According to the “14th Five-Year Plan for National Work Safety”, the promotion of digital supervision of safety production relies on the joint efforts of comprehensive supervision departments, industry supervision departments, and production work units, showing the characteristics of collective action of multi-subject collaboration. However, safety production is essentially a public good, with the distinctive features of non-competitiveness and non-exclusivity. Advancing the digital transformation process is influenced by stakeholder factors. In the pursuit of collective action, the regulator and the regulated party are affected by problems such as information asymmetry, responsibility sharing, and lack of coordination, which may lead to free-rider behavior, moral hazard, and other tendencies that undermine collective action, showing a tripartite game relationship in the digital supervision of safety production. Coupled with the contingency and randomness of accidents and disasters, the complexity of risks exacerbates the randomness and uncertainty of the game system. How to find the game stability of the collective action of safety production supervision under the digitalization process among comprehensive supervision departments, industry supervision departments, and production work units, and analyze the evolutionary logic of multi-party achieving collective action is the core proposition of this paper, which can provide a certain theoretical reference for the construction of intelligent emergency development under the background of the digital economy.
Based on the institutional collective action framework, this paper constructs a tripartite random evolutionary game model, discusses the strategic impact and evolution trend of different factors on the digital collaborative supervision of safety production from the perspectives of cooperation benefits and transaction costs, and then analyzes the cooperation mechanism of various parties to achieve collective action. The Gaussian white noise is introduced into the three-party evolutionary game replication dynamic system to reflect that the process of digital collaborative supervision of safety production is disturbed by random factors. Thus, a stochastic evolutionary game model is established, and the model is solved by stochastic process theory. The system dynamics is further used for simulation analysis, and a causal feedback loop among comprehensive supervision departments, industry supervision departments, and production work units is established, parameter assignments are set according to the model solving conditions, and simulation analysis of initial probability and intervention by different factors is carried out respectively.
The study results show that the initial willingness has a certain impact on the implementation of the digital transformation of production work units. However, with the cost input and the action cycle lengthening, the regulatory authorities and production units gradually reduce the collective action willingness in the absence of further incentives. Production work units are the key entities that consider cost factors, and their sensitivity to the impact of relevant transaction costs is much higher than that of the two types of regulatory entities. At the same time, incentive intervention has a more significant effect on the realization of consistent motivation, especially the credibility benefit as a collective benefit has a greater continuous incentive for collective action. Accumulating collaborative relationship capital by strengthening communication and establishing institutional or informal multilateral cooperation, consultation and coordination mechanisms can effectively remove the collaborative barriers to collective action, thereby promoting the game system to a positive and stable state.
According to the conclusions, this paper proposes to rely on the existing safety production deliberation and coordination institutions to establish a cross-departmental cooperation mechanism for safety production digitalization, at the same time increase the government’s special support for the digital transformation of safety production in production work units, and further coordinate the responsibility boundaries of the regulatory authorities and strengthen the main responsibility of the production units.

Key words: collaborative supervision of safety production, digital transformation, stochastic evolutionary game, institutional collective action

摘要： 随着信息技术的发展和工业4.0时代的到来,安全生产逐渐向数字化、智能化转变。本文基于制度性集体行动框架,构建了基于综合监管部门、行业监管部门和生产经营单位的三方主体随机演化博弈模型,研究集体行动因素对主体策略演化的影响。结果表明:随机干扰环境下,博弈主体策略呈现出明显的波动趋势。生产经营单位对成本因素的敏感度高于监管部门。激励性干预举措对于集体行动的一致性动机效果显著。通过增强部门联动机制、积累协同关系资本可以促使集体行动趋于稳定。因此,要完善安全生产领域数字化协同监管跨部门协作机制,增加对安全生产数字化转型的专项扶持力度,捋顺并强化不同主体的监管责任,促进安全生产数字化协同监管集体行动的持续稳定。

关键词: 安全生产协同监管, 数字化转型, 随机演化博弈, 制度性集体行动