Abstract: In the era of the digital economy, the development trend of e-commerce is getting better. With the help of the “four trillion” economic stimulus and the integration of the digital economy under the policy of innovation after the financial tsunami, China’s traditional commodity trading market through the digital transformation of the industry has actively evolved into a commodity electronic trading market. Commodity spot trading platform has a low barrier to entry, operating products with strong consumer attributes, and users with strong investment and profit-making purposes. Relying on the flexible operation mode, the platform has led to an increase in market turnover, and at the same time, it has also become the main target of the “grey industry chain of illegal rights”, which seriously restricts the orderly operation and benign development of the commodities spot trading platform. Intelligent regulatory technology in the digital economy era for commodities spot trading platform to break through the profit-making rights investment “regulatory dilemma” provides a powerful weapon, but the platform of intelligent regulatory technology threshold is high, the transition is difficult, so how to promote China’s commodities spot trading platform to fulfill its regulatory obligations through government regulation and guidance and enhance the level of regulatory intelligence is crucial.
Based on the theory of responsive regulation, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model with limited rationality “investment user-platform” as the main body of the game, starting from the analysis of the responsive regulatory mechanism of intelligent regulation on profit-making rights protection. The dynamic evolution path of the governance strategy of commodity spot trading platform and the investment strategy of investment user groups under the influence of key factors such as the government’s intelligent regulatory subsidies, the ability of intelligent regulatory technology to identify profit-making rights protection, and the cost of users’profit-making rights protection are comprehensively considered. In order to break through the limitation of the mainstream evolutionary game research simulation experiment of “describing the linearity of structural equations”, the multi-agent simulation method is chosen to construct simulation experiment, explain the complex nonlinear iterative process of system emergence phenomena, and discuss how to reasonably control investors’demand for preserving and increasing value while controlling transaction risks and realizing reasonable supervision of multiple innovative trading modes. It researches services for the healthy development of spot trading platforms for commodities, and the return to the positioning of electronic trading platforms for commodities to promote physical circulation and strengthen real economy services.
It is found that the improvement of the intelligent supervision level of commodity spot trading platforms has a certain positive influence on maintaining the benign development of the market. However, when market investors have a high incidence of profit-seeking rights protection, and the trading environment is relatively harsh, relying solely on the platform itself to enhance its intelligent regulatory technology cannot make the market’s operating status develop in a favorable manner. At this time, government support is particularly important for the intelligent transformation of commodity spot trading platform supervision. In addition, curbing the development of the gray industry chain to enhance the cost of investors’rights, is an effective way to solve the dilemma of the commodity spot trading platform.
Based on the simplified analysis, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with platform and consumers as the game subjects. However, the governance of the commodity spot trading platform for profit rights protection should also involve third-party service agencies and other multi-entities. Therefore, from the perspective of profit-making rights protection speculative costs, it will be the focus of future research to consider the optimization of control strategies for third-party institutions providing rights protection services as game players.

Key words: bulk commodity spot trading platform, profit-making rights protection, intelligent supervision, evolutionary games, multi-subject simulation

摘要： “非法牟利维权”问题严重制约了大宗商品现货交易平台的有序经营与良性发展,数字经济时代智能监管技术为平台提供了有力武器,但智能化监管技术门槛高、转型难度大,如何通过政府规制与引导促进我国大宗商品现货交易平台履行监管义务并提升监管水平至关重要。本文基于回应性监管理论,构建以有限理性“投资型用户-平台”为博弈主体的动态演化博弈模型,最后采用多主体仿真实验动态刻画博弈系统演化过程,揭示了投资型用户的有限理性对平台治理策略的动态影响。研究发现:大宗商品现货交易平台智能监管水平的提升对维持市场良性发展具有一定积极意义,但当市场投资者牟利维权高发、交易环境较为恶劣时,单纯依靠平台自身提升智能监管技术,无法使市场的经营状态向好发展。此时,政府扶持力度对于大宗商品现货交易平台的监管智能化转型尤为重要。最后,本文为破解大宗商品现货交易平台“牟利维权”困境提供了政策与管理建议。

关键词: 大宗商品现货交易平台, 牟利维权, 智能监管, 演化博弈, 多主体仿真