Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (11): 139-146.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2023.0364

• Evolutionary Game Theory in the Digital Economy Era • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing and Cooperation in Blockchain Autonomous Organizations Based on Prospect Theory

LI Zhihong, QIAO Guihong, XU Xiaoying, TIAN Minghao   

  1. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China
  • Received:2022-07-31 Online:2023-11-25 Published:2024-01-30

基于前景理论的区块链自治组织知识共享协同合作演化博弈研究

李志宏, 乔贵鸿, 许小颖, 田明昊   

  1. 华南理工大学 工商管理学院,广东 广州 510640
  • 通讯作者: 许小颖(1987-),男,广东揭阳人,博士,副教授,博士生导师,研究方向:区块链应用,推荐系统。
  • 作者简介:李志宏(1969-),男,福建福州人,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:知识管理,区块链应用;乔贵鸿(1994-),男,河南焦作人,博士研究生,研究方向:区块链应用,在线社区;田明昊(2000-),男,江苏苏州人,硕士研究生,研究方向:大数据分析,区块链应用。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171089,72071083);广东省自然科学基金项目(2021A1515012003)

Abstract: In the age of the knowledge economy, online communities serve as quintessential crowd-sourcing platforms, fostering the emergence of collective wisdom and knowledge sharing that effectively propels open collaboration in knowledge innovation. Traditional social media platforms, mainly built on centralized organizational structures, inherently harbor numerous issues such as user privacy breaches, disparities between user contributions and earnings, and a dearth of efficacious incentive mechanisms. On one hand, conventional centralized platforms store all user data on centralized servers, thereby permitting platform administrators to exploit or sell this data for profit without user consent. On the other hand, user-generated content’s rights and benefits should naturally belong to creators, but most centralized platforms commodify user contributions while users receive negligible gains or no share of them. Furthermore, the uniform incentive mechanisms tend to conform to the “90-9-1” rule in community knowledge contributions, substantially dampening the enthusiasm of users for sharing high-quality knowledge.
The ascendance of blockchain technology has catalyzed a shift in organizational paradigms, giving rise to the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), a new form that addresses the knowledge governance limitations of conventional centralized communities. Hsieh characterizes blockchain-based autonomous organizations (hereinafter referred to as blockchain autonomous organizations) as entities capable of functioning autonomously devoid of centralized control or third-party intervention. Steemitis the most representative of blockchain autonomous organizations, having devised an incentive mechanism encompassing three underlying tokens. This structure dispenses token rewards and community privileges impartially to users who contribute to community development, encompassing knowledge creation, sharing, and dissemination. Contrasting with conventional knowledge communities, the Steemit community leverages the token’s value traits and governance capacities, not only augmenting anticipated user benefits but also conferring community governance rights. This strategy directly achieves knowledge realization and spurs user participation in collaborative knowledge sharing on a material level.
The decision-making process for users engaged in knowledge sharing entails intricate dynamics, with cooperative behavior contingent upon external influences. Given that token incentives underpin a dynamic reward mechanism within community user groups’collaborative cooperation, the variability of anticipated returns yields divergent perceptions of gains and losses among economically rational agents. Traditional evolutionary game models fall short in comprehensively explaining irrational psychological factors and knowledge sharing actors’expectations of income. Prospect theory, capable of effectively analyzing knowledge sharing subjects’decision-making within uncertain contexts and their preferences for gains and losses, is harnessed here to enhance the game income matrix for knowledge sharing subjects. This study probes the evolutionary stability strategies of user sharing behavior within blockchain autonomous organizations, scrutinizing their influence on user knowledge sharing choices through simulations and analyses of various parameter variables, and ultimately furnishing pertinent management recommendations.
Simulation reveals that users’willingness to partake in knowledge sharing and collaborative cooperation is significantly influenced by factors like token rewards, their distribution coefficient, and sharing costs. Notably, knowledge creators’perceived risks exert substantial sway over sharing strategies, whereas mutual potential benefits exert a relatively minor impact. Conclusively, this paper’s research insights provide actionable suggestions for the wholesome development of blockchain autonomous organizations. Future endeavors will extend this study to explore the ramifications of token incentives on user conduct within blockchain autonomous organizations based on the conclusions drawn herein.

Key words: prospect theory, blockchain token, collaborative cooperation, evolutionary game

摘要: 知识共享协同合作是一个错综复杂的动态过程,在考虑到区块链自治组织利用通证来激励用户参与知识共享协同合作的背景下,本研究引入前景理论,旨在有效解释知识共享行为主体对通证收益的感知情况。为此,本文构建了知识共享协同合作收益感知矩阵,并基于该矩阵对博弈双方的行为策略进行了演化博弈分析,从而为知识共享协同合作的可持续性提供了有益建议。研究结果显示,用户对通证损益的感知价值、协同合作成本以及通证收益分配等因素,在用户持续参与知识共享方面扮演着关键角色。为促进区块链知识社区用户的知识共享协同合作稳定性,加强平台治理机制、优化通证激励模式,以及合理设置通证收益分配系数等措施被认为是十分有效的。本研究为理解区块链知识社区中涉及的复杂关系提供了新的视角,并为实现其可持续发展提供了实际可行的建议路径。

关键词: 前景理论, 区块链通证, 协同合作, 演化博弈

CLC Number: