Abstract: Driven by the wave of the digital economy and the deepening of the aging population, the digital divide for the elderly has been exacerbated, making the elderly as a digitally vulnerable group out of touch with the digital information age, causing the elderly to fall into an information crisis and technological panic, and further affecting social security and efficiency. Therefore, in order to actively address the issue of the aging digital divide and better integrate them into the digital age, making an intelligent technology innovation for aging is an important measure to address the digital divide in the elderly. It can optimize the solution of high-frequency elderly related services such as online appointments and provide products that meet the needs of the elderly, and fully consider the special needs of the elderly population from the process of intelligent technology research and application. However, how to carry out innovation activities has become a focus of current attention. It is not only necessary to rely on enterprises to carry out technological innovation to achieve research on aging, but also require the government to play a guiding role and provide policy support and institutional guarantees. At the same time, this can stimulate elderly consumers to actively participate and provide feedback on their own needs, closely combine the supply and demand sides, and ultimately achieve the joint participation of multiple entities.
This paper builds a three-party evolutionary game for enterprises, elderly consumers and the government. It emphasizes the joint participation of multiple parties, which assumes the responsibility of product innovation for aging, meeting social needs, and creating social well-being. Considering the complexity and high uncertainty of the real situation, the Gaussian white noise is added to show the disturbance of the game subject during the evolution process, and the stochastic evolutionary game model is established. The stochastic differential equation theory is used to analyze the conditions for the stability of the game subject, and computer simulation is used to analyze the evolution process and strategy selection of the three-party game subject.
The results show that random factors interfere with the strategic choices of enterprises, elderly consumers and the government in responsible innovation. With the increase of interference intensity, the fluctuation range of the game subject to a stable state is larger and the evolution speed is slower. Under the situation of government supervision, the government’s cost subsidy and reward and punishment mechanism are conducive to mobilizing the enthusiasm of the participants to carry out responsible innovation. The changes in the losses of the three participants of enterprises, elderly consumers and the government have a consistent direction for their respective strategic choices. When the losses of enterprises, elderly consumers and the government increase, the three-party game subject is more inclined to choose the (participation, participation, supervision) strategy. Based on the above research conclusions, the following three countermeasures and suggestions are mainly proposed. Firstly, enterprises play a technology oriented role in responsible innovation, providing intelligent products and services to the elderly and meeting their diverse needs. Secondly, elderly consumers actively participate in responsible innovation, taking on the responsibility of maintaining public interests, meeting the needs of the elderly, and adapting to digital intelligent technology. Finally, the government plays a guiding role in responsible innovation. On the one hand, the government adopts cost subsidy measures to mobilize the participation enthusiasm of enterprises and elderly groups. On the other hand, the government attaches great importance to the implementation effect of various policies and adopts regulatory measures to ensure the effectiveness of these policies.

Key words: aging digital divide, intelligent technology for aging, responsible innovation, stochastic evolutionary game

摘要： 在数字经济浪潮和人口老龄化加深的双重驱动下加剧了老年数字鸿沟,使得老年群体作为数字弱势群体与数字信息化时代脱节。因此本文以应对老年数字鸿沟为例,构建了企业、老年消费者和政府的智能技术适老化负责任创新的三方演化博弈模型。考虑到现实状况的复杂多变和高度不确定性,加入高斯白噪声来展示博弈主体在演化过程中受到的扰动,建立不确定因素下三方博弈主体开展负责任创新的随机演化博弈模型。研究表明:随机因素对负责任创新中三方博弈主体的策略选择产生了干扰,随着随机干扰强度的增加,博弈主体演化至稳定状态的波动幅度越大和演化速度变慢;在政府监管情景下,政府的成本补贴和奖惩机制有利于调动参与主体开展负责任创新的积极性;企业、老年消费者、政府三方参与主体的损失变化对各自的策略选择影响具有方向一致性,当企业、老年消费者、政府的损失增加时,三方博弈主体更倾向于选择(参与,参与,监管)策略。

关键词: 数字鸿沟, 智能技术适老化, 负责任创新, 随机演化博弈