Abstract: Platform economy is an important gripper to promote the development of digital economy, and the flexible employment by platform enterprises has become an important channel to alleviate and solve the employment pressure of workers. However, driven by digital technology, platform enterprises have the problems of behavioral alienation and a lack of social responsibility, which makes it difficult for employees (the flexible employment personnel of platform enterprises) to fairly participate in the process of benefit distribution and share the development achievements of platform enterprises. This inevitably triggers a “trust crisis” among employees, threatening the sustainable development of platform enterprises. Therefore, under the situation that platform enterprises lack effective supervision and are difficult to self-correct, it has become a highly concerned issue that how to effectively solve the above problems to achieve a win-win situation for platform enterprises and employees. Under the realistic background of strong capital and weak labor, the effective intervention of union as the spokesperson of labor interests is expected to protect the legitimate rights and interests of employees. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of platform enterprise-union co-opetition relations and numerical experiments are carried out with MATLAB to analyze the evolutionary process of platform enterprise-union co-opetition relations.
The results show that: (1)There is no evolutionary equilibrium in the process of co-opetition game between the platform enterprise and union, and the behavior strategies adopted by the two parties present a cyclical pattern. This shows that under the “strong capital and weak labor” reality, the evolution of the platform enterprise-union co-opetition relations is in a long-term dynamic process of continuous adjustment. Both parties optimize their own interests through selection of cooperative and competitive strategies, which reflects the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation between the platform enterprise and the union. (2)A defect in the current platform enterprise-union co-opetition evolutionary mechanism is that the traditional weak union situation makes it difficult for both parties to establish effective cooperation, but a stronger status of the union will greatly improve this situation. This indicates that the crux of the imperfect mechanism of platform enterprise-union co-opetition evolution lies in the insufficient status of unions in platform enterprises.
To this end, countermeasures and suggestions are proposed from the perspectives of the union and platform enterprise. On the one hand, from the union’s perspective, the union may rely on the national legal system and exert its own initiative, and get rid of its old appearance as a puppet of the enterprise through direct election of its chairman and active cooperation with higher-level unions, thereby enhancing its independence of the platform enterprise. The union chairman directly elected by employees represents the will of most employees, and therefore will actively seek equality in communication and the game with the platform enterprise, effectively play the role of employee spokesperson, and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the employees. This should compensate for the inherent asymmetry in the status of the two parties. On the other hand, from the platform enterprise’s perspective, the platform enterprise should respect the status of its union and the interests and needs of its employees. Through actively establishing a cooperative relationship with the union and improving its labor condition, the platform enterprise will be able to stabilize the workforce and greatly reduce the possibility of both parties adopting a competitive strategy, therefore achieving a win-win goal among the platform enterprise, the union and the employees, and promoting the vigorous development of the digital economy.

Key words: co-opetition relations, platform enterprise, union, evolutionary game

摘要： 在资强劳弱的现实背景下,作为劳方利益的代言人工会的有效介入来保护员工合法权益被寄予了期望,论文运用演化博弈的方法建立平台企业-工会竞合关系的演化博弈模型,并运用MATLAB软件进行数值实验,分析平台企业-工会竞合关系的演变过程。结果表明:平台企业与工会的竞合博弈过程不存在演化均衡状态,双方的行为策略选择呈现周期性模式,体现出平台企业与工会的竞合动态关系;平台企业-工会竞合演化机制存在缺陷,在传统的弱工会情境下,双方难以实现有效合作,但随着工会地位的增强,这种局面会得到改善。对此,论文从平台企业和工会两个方面提出对策建议,以期促进平台企业构建和谐劳资关系,达到共赢的目标,助力数字经济健康发展。

关键词: 竞合关系, 平台企业, 工会, 演化博弈