Abstract: Driven by digital technology, China’s short video and webcast users continue to expand, and the live streaming e-commerce industry has achieved rapid development. The new marketing model has gradually attracted everyone’s attention. In the context of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy, live streaming commerce can effectively stimulate domestic consumption and promote economic development. However, while the live streaming commerce industry is booming, product quality problems have arisen such as shoddy products and products without guarantee after sales. Therefore, exploring the reasons for frequent quality problems of live streaming is of great significance for guiding the development of the live streaming commerce industry and promoting domestic economic development.
Aiming at the problem of low product quality in live streaming commerce, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze the strategy choice of anchors, manufacturers, platforms and consumers. In the process of live streaming, the anchor charges a certain admission fee and commission from the manufacturer and uses the e-commerce platform to sell products to consumers through live streaming. The platform charges a certain percentage of fees for the live streaming activities of the anchors, and is responsible for the quality of the products produced by the manufacturers and the behavior of the anchors.Firstly, we assume that: (1)The strategic choice of anchors is {strict product selection, loose product selection}. (2)The strategic choice of the manufacturer is {self-disciplined production, not self-disciplined production}. (3)The strategic choice of the platform is {active regulation, negative regulation}. (4)Consumer behavior choices include {active rights protection,negative rights protection}. Secondly, the payment matrix of strategic choice among anchors, manufacturers, platforms and consumers is constructed, and the replication dynamic equation is presented. We solve an equilibrium strategy in an evolutionary game. And then, the stability analysis of anchor selection behavior, manufacturer production behavior, platform supervision behavior and consumer rights protection behavior is carried out respectively based on the possible equilibrium solution. Finally, the asymptotic steady state with different parameters is solved by a numerical simulation method, and the influence of the change of key parameters on the four-party strategy selection is analyzed.
The research result shows that: (1)The recognition efficiency and selection behavior of anchors for undisciplined manufacturers are important factors affecting the strategy selection of manufacturers and platforms. Strict product selection and improved identification efficiency of anchors reduce the probability of cooperation with undisciplined manufacturers, and can urge manufacturers to make self-disciplined production and improve product quality in the market. In addition, whether manufacturers are self-disciplined in production is also affected by the regulatory behavior of the platform. (2)The strict selection of anchors forms a certain alternative to the supervision of the platform. The improved identification efficiency of anchors reduces the possibility of unqualified products flowing into the market, and will prompt the platform to relax the supervision of product quality issues. (3)Consumer rights protection will cause the anchor and platform to suffer user losses, and have a positive impact on the behavior of the anchor and platform. With the increase of user losses, the behavior of anchors and platforms tend to be strict selection and active supervision respectively. In addition, the behavior of the platform is also affected by user stickiness. Reducing users’dependence on the platform can increase the willingness of the platform to actively supervise. (4)An appropriate increase in punishment on the platform will prompt anchors and manufacturers to change their negative behaviors, but increasing punishment alone cannot have a long-term impact on manufacturers’behaviors to stabilize them in the strategy of self-disciplined production. In addition to punishment, the platform should also consider taking other ways to control the status quo of frequent product quality problems in live streaming.

Key words: live streaming commerce, product quality supervision, anchor identification efficiency, evolutionary game

摘要： 本文针对直播带货中存在的产品质量低下问题,构建了主播、商家、平台和消费者的四方演化博弈模型,讨论主播识别效率等因素对四方策略选择的影响。研究发现:主播严格选品并提高对不自律商家的识别效率,可以督促商家进行自律生产;消费者维权所造成的用户损失,会对主播和商家的行为产生正向影响,用户损失和平台连带损失系数是影响主播和平台行为的关键因素,用户损失越大,主播严格选品积极性越高,连带系数越大,平台监管意愿越强;平台的惩罚能够促使主播和商家改变其消极的行为选择,但仅靠增加惩罚不能对商家行为产生长效的影响,应当与其他手段配合;消费者维权和平台监管,可以促进主播严格选品,同时约束商家进行自律生产,在一定程度上缓解直播带货中存在的产品质量低下问题。

关键词: 直播带货, 产品质量监管, 主播识别效率, 演化博弈