Abstract: The popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of network technology have increased the channels for consumers to obtain information. More and more consumers not only rationally analyze the prices of different sales channels, but also make the decision of postponing purchase based on their own expectations. Strategic consumers increase the supply chain uncertainty. With the rapid development of e-commerce, online shopping has gradually evolved into a very important part of consumer life. Commodity sales have also broken through geographical and spatial restrictions. Many retailers provide goods to some consumers through third-party platforms such as Taobao and JD.com. Consumers also prefer to buy products through e-commerce channels. Traditional retailers usually consider opening online sales channels on the basis of the traditional offline channels. The retailer's profit is not only affected by the supplier's pricing, but also closely related to the type of supply chain contract. The emergence of online channel has increased the complexity of the supply chain, forming a dual-channel in which offline channel and online channel coexist. Dual-channel has aroused extensive discussion in the industry and academia, and has become an important research topic in supply chain management. This paper studies the selection of supply chain contract between the manufacturer and retailer when there are strategic consumers and retailer open online channel, and analyzes the change of retailers' dual-channel decisions under wholesale price contract and quantity discount contract.
We consider a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Manufacturer sell goods to retailer based on the supply chain contract, and retailer resell products to strategic consumers. Retailer decide whether to add online sales channel according to the market. The model is divided into two stages. In the first stage, manufacturer and retailer choose to adopt wholesale price contract or quantity discount contract. In the second stage, retailers decide whether to add online sales channel. At the beginning of the first stage, consumers arrive at the market and make purchase decisions. Consumer can buy at most one unit of goods (purchase or give up). All consumers are strategic consumers. They foresee that retailers may add online channel, so they will strategically wait until the second stage of purchase, in order to obtain greater utility from online channel.
First of all, the paper solves the equilibrium solution of the game through the backwards-induction. Secondly, the paper compares the profits of the manufacturer and retailer in decentralize supply chain and centralizes supply chain under wholesale price contract and quantity discount contract, and discusses the optimal supply chain contract between the manufacturer and retailer. Then the paper studies the optimal decision of the manufacturer and retailer by analyzing the impact of different pricing of retailers' online and offline channel on the supply chain profit. The research results show that: (1)When the retailer does not open online channel, quantity discount contract can better coordinate the supply chain and increase the overall revenue of the supply chain. Whether in decentralized supply chain and centralized supply, supply chain profit under the quantity discount contract is not lower than that under the wholesale price contract. At this time, the profit distribution of the manufacturer and retailer is determined by the quantity discount coefficient. The upstream manufacturer with more dominant power in the supply chain is in an advantageous position discount contract. (2)When the retailer opens online channel, the wholesale price contract can better coordinate the supply chain discount contract. Under the wholesale price contract, the optimal pricing of retailer offline channel will increase, and the internal transfer price of online channel will decrease. When the parameters meet certain conditions, the supply chain profit under the wholesale price contract is higher than that under the quantity discount contract.
This paper mainly gets the following management enlightenment: (1)The manufacturer needs to consider consumers' foresight, patience and acceptance of online channel. The manufacturer can obtain the psychological expectation of strategic consumption on goods through sampling survey, award-winning questionnaire and customer return visit. (2)The retailer opening online channel needs to consider the opening cost of new channel, and also needs to pay attention to the impact of logistics and online platform credibility, on target customers. When strategic consumers prefer online channel and the reliability of online sales channel is high, both manufacturers and retailer will benefit from it.
The paper considers that all consumers in the market are strategic consumers, and does not consider the competitive situation of multiple manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain. The situation that strategic consumers and short-sighted consumers exist in the market can be regarded as the future research direction. Besides wholesale price contract and quantity discount contract, other supply chain contracts can also be used as research topics. For example, analysis of the impact of manufacturers' recovery contract and revenue sharing contract on retailers' opening of online channel.

Key words: strategic consumer, supply chain, dual-channel decision making, wholesale price contract, quantity discount contract

摘要： 研究了存在策略性消费者且零售商在原有线下渠道基础上开通线上渠道时,制造商与零售商供应链合同的选择问题。通过逆推法比较不同供应链合同下,制造商与零售商做分散决策和集中决策获得的收益以及零售商线上线下不同渠道定价决策对供应链整体收益的影响,讨论制造商和零售商的最优决策。得出主要结论为:在一般情况下数量折扣合同能更好的协调供应链,增加整体收益;然而当策略性消费者的耐心程度,对线上销售渠道接受程度增加时,批发价格合同更适用于考虑零售商开通线上销售渠道的情况。

关键词: 策略性消费者, 供应链, 双渠道决策, 批发价格合同, 数量折扣合同