Abstract: The unique economic relations of a financial conglomerate form an intricate economic network within the conglomerate. We construct a model of risk contagion within the financial conglomerate based on the equity relationship and related party transactions to form a directed network. Our work shows that the risk is shared by the conglomerate members, the bankruptcy cost borne by the conglomerate members is small, and the financial conglomerate is stable as long as the number of shareholding counterparties exceeds a certain threshold. The research also suggests that if the shareholding counterparty is fixed, there is no monotonous relationship between the risk contagion and the shareholding proportion. The financial conglomerate has a trade-off between the number of shareholding counterparties and the shareholding ratio to reduce the possibility of risk contagion within the conglomerate. In addition, the study finds that related party transactions will increase the losses of the other members if a conglomerate member is in crisis, thereby expanding the risk and the scope of risk contagion among conglomerate members. This paper provides theoretical guidance on the distribution of equity and the scale of related party transactions in financial conglomerates.

Key words: financial conglomerates, risk contagion, equity distribution, related party transaction

摘要： 金融控股集团特有的经济关系形成集团内部错综复杂的经济网络,本文基于集团内部的股权结构和关联交易形成有向网络,构建金融控股集团内部风险传染的模型。研究结果表明:持股对手数量超过某一临界值时,风险被集团成员共同分担,成员仅需承担较小的破产成本,集团稳定;持股对手数量固定时,集团内部风险传染情况与持股比重之间不存在单调关系。集团在持股对手数量和持股比重之间存在权衡,以此减小集团内部风险传播的可能性。此外,当集团成员爆发危机后,关联交易将增大集团成员的损失,从而扩大风险以及风险传播范围。本文为金融控股集团股权分配和关联交易规模提供了理论指导。

关键词: 金融控股集团, 风险传染, 股权关系, 关联交易