Abstract: Considering the contract price mode of “protection price” and the quantity loss in the circulation, this paper explores the impact of the government taxing the company and subsiding the tax revenue to the farmer on the decision-making and operation of a contract-farming supply chain based on “company+farmer” contract-farming background. We first consider the case that the coefficient of government subsidy to the farmer is exogenous. Taking taxation and non-subsidy as a benchmark, we compare and analyze the equilibrium results in two situations of non-subsidy and subsidy. The research shows the government's tax subsidy to the farmer canencourage the farmer to increase its production quantities and prompt the company to lower its protection price in deep-processing situation when the input tax rate is lower than the output tax rate. This in turn increases the expected revenues of both parties, i.e., the tax subsidy is the Pareto improvement of taxation and non-subsidy. However, the benefits of tax subsidy are all captured by the company due to its powerful position in primary-processing situation when the input tax rate is equal to the output tax rate. Therefore, it ishard to realize the purpose of increasing the farmer'sproduction and income simply by tax subsidy. Subsequently, the government subsidy coefficient is deemed as an endogenous variable. It is proved that there exists a unique optimal tax subsidy coefficient to maximize the government's social welfare in deep-processing situation, and the optimal tax subsidy coefficient has the upper and lower bounds with the variation of different parameters, whenthe input tax rate is lower than the output tax rate. Finally, a numerical example is introduced to verify the above conclusions. Meanwhile, we find that the optimal tax subsidy coefficient decreases with the increasing of circulation loss rate, and increases with the increasing of output tax rate and marginal profit rate of supply chain in deep-processing situation. Social welfare and the company's expected profit is more sensitive to changes in the circulation loss rate than the farmers' expected profit is.

Key words: contract-farming, supply chain, protection price, tax subsidy

摘要： 基于“公司+农户”型订单农业背景,引入“随行就市,保底收购”的合约价格方式并考虑农产品流通中的数量损耗,探究了政府向公司征税并将税收收入补贴给农户对于订单农业供应链决策及运作的影响。首先,在政府对农户的补贴系数外生时,以政府征税不补贴为基准模型,对比分析了政府征税不补贴和征税补贴两种情形下的均衡结果,发现:若公司对农产品深加工,则进项税率小于销项税率,政府对农户进行税收补贴,可激励农户提高生产量并促使公司降低保底价格,进而增加双方期望收益,即征税补贴是征税不补贴的帕累托改善;若公司对农产品初加工,进项税率等于销项税率,则税收补贴带来的收益全部被公司利用其强势地位所攫取,单纯的税收补贴难以实现农户增产增收的目的。随后,在政府补贴系数内生时,证明了深加工情形下存在唯一最优的税收补贴系数使得政府社会福利最大化,且最优的税收补贴系数随各参数的变化存在上下界。最后,引入数值算例验证了上述结论,同时发现,深加工情形下政府决策的最优税收补贴系数随流通损耗率的增加而减小,随销项税率和供应链边际利润率的增大而增大;社会福利和公司的期望收益对流通损耗率的变化较之农户的期望收益对其变化更为敏感。

关键词: 订单农业, 供应链, 保底收购, 税收补贴