Abstract: A low-carbon tourism supply chain consisting of a low-carbon scenic spot and a travel agency, and the influence of corporate social responsibility behavior on supply chain dynamic equilibrium is considered. The differential game model of low carbon tourism supply chain under corporate social responsibility behavior is constructed. Optimal decision-making, reputation of scenic spot and member and system utility are solved under four decision-making modes: Nash non-cooperation, service cost sharing, publicity cost sharing and centralization. It is found that tourism enterprises should improve the low-carbon decision-making level while consumers' low-carbon preference increases; The formulation of cost-sharing contracts needs to meet certain conditions, only under certain conditions, the increase of corporate social responsibility in supply chain would increase the proportion of cost sharing, and the increase in consumers' low-carbon preferences reduces the cost-sharing ratio; Under cost-sharing model, the corporate social responsibility of the leader directly improves its own decision-making level, indirectly promots the decision-making level of the follower, and increases cost-sharing ratio. Corporate social responsibility preference does not change the effectiveness of cost-sharing contracts.

Key words: low carbon tourism supply chain, differential game, cost sharing, corporate social responsibility

摘要： 针对由一低碳景区和一旅行社构成的低碳旅游供应链,考虑了供应链成员企业社会责任行为对供应链动态均衡的影响,构建了企业社会责任行为下的低碳旅游供应链微分博弈模型。研究发现:旅游企业应在消费者低碳偏好增加的同时提高低碳决策水平;成本分担合同的制定需满足一定的条件,且只有在一定条件下,供应链企业社会责任的增加会提高成本分担比例,而消费者低碳偏好的增加降低了成本分担比例;成本分担模式下,主导者的企业社会责任直接提升了自身的决策水平,间接提升了跟随者的决策水平,提高了成本分担比例;企业社会责任偏好不会改变成本分担合同的有效性。

关键词: 低碳旅游供应链, 微分博弈, 成本分担, 企业社会责任