Abstract: To effectively motivate or regulate the cooperative behavior of private sector, this study considers the risk preference of private sector when analyzing the issue of the control rights allocation for PPP projects, and then establishes the expected utility function of bounded rationality to propose the dynamic adjustment principle of control rights for private sector under the portfolios of different risk preference. The results indicate that in the case of the risk-neutral government, when the private sector is risk aversion, there is the minimum motivation threshold for the control right share, which is negatively related to the risk-averse degree. The findings illustrate the achievement of the regulation effect for control rights under the premise of motivation. When the private sector is risk-seeking, there is a maximum regulation threshold for the control right share, which is positively related to the risk-seeking degree. The findings elucidate the realization of the motivation effect for control rights under the premise of regulation. Besides, the outputs of the government are negatively associated with the risk-averse degree and the control right share of private sector, but positively associated with the risk-seeking degree of private sector. Finally, based on the different risk preference portfolios, this research further applies the numerical analysis to demonstrate the incentive and regulatory effects of private sector's control right share on their cooperative behavior, and the impacts on the outputs of the government.

Key words: PPP projects, control rights, risk preference, the effects of motivation and regulation, cooperative behavior

摘要： 为有效激励或规制社会资本的合作行为,在分析PPP项目控制权配置问题时,考虑社会资本风险偏好进而构建有限理性期望效用函数,得出不同风险偏好组合下社会资本的控制权动态调整原则。研究表明,在政府为风险中性的前提下,风险规避的社会资本的控制权比例有最低激励阈值且与其风险规避系数呈负增长关系,体现控制权在激励的环境下实现规制的作用;风险趋向的社会资本的控制权比例有最高规制阈值且与其风险趋向系数呈正增长关系,体现控制权在规制的环境下实现激励的作用;政府产出随社会资本的风险规避系数、控制权比例呈负增长,而随社会资本风险趋向系数呈正增长。最后通过数值分析,进一步论证了在不同风险偏好组合下社会资本的控制权份额对其合作行为的激励规制效应及其对政府产出的影响。

关键词: PPP项目, 控制权, 风险偏好, 激励规制效应, 合作行为