Abstract: Based on the customer's cancellation behavior, this paper constructs a game model of hotels under the framework of Hotelling model and analyzes the choice of cancellation policies between two competitive hotels. The results show that, when the sensitivity of customers to the horizontal differentiation between two hotels is high, if the cancellation rate differentiation between the two hotels is small, the two hotels will choose loose cancellation policy, and if the cancellation rate differentiation is large, the hotel with high cancellation rate will choose the strict cancellation policy, and the hotel with low cancellation rate will choose the loose cancellation policy. When the sensitivity of customers to the horizontal differentiation between the hotels is low and the cancellation rate differentiation between the two hotels is small, there are two evolutionarily stable strategies, and the hotel only chooses the opposite strategy to the competitor to get the maximum profit. Our study provides theoretical support for hotels in cancellation policy decision and revenue management.

Key words: cancellation behavior, cancelation policies, hotelling model, evolutionary game

摘要： 基于顾客的取消预订行为,在Hotelling模型框架下构建了酒店的博弈模型,分析了两竞争性酒店退订政策选择的问题。研究表明,当顾客对酒店之间水平差异的敏感程度较高时,若两酒店的预订取消率差异较小,则两酒店都将选择宽松的退订政策;若取消率差异较大,则取消率较高的酒店将选择严格的退订政策,而取消率较低的酒店将选择宽松的退订政策。当顾客对酒店之间水平差异的敏感程度较低且两酒店的预订取消率差异较小时,系统存在两个演化稳定策略,酒店只有选择与竞争对手相反的策略才能获得最大收益。本研究能够为酒店的决策制定和收益管理提供一定的支持。

关键词: 取消预订行为, 退订政策, Hotelling模型, 演化博弈