Pricing Game between Repair and Support Ships and Shipyards for Repairing Damaged Ships at Sea

doi:10.12005/orms.2022.0143

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 23-29.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0143

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles Next Articles

Pricing Game between Repair and Support Ships and Shipyards for Repairing Damaged Ships at Sea

ZHAO Rui-jia^1,2, XIE Xin-lian^1,2, LI Guo-dong¹

1. Integrated Transport Institute, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China;
2. Logistics Research Institute, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China

Received:2019-05-20 Online:2022-05-25 Published:2022-07-20

维修保障船与修船厂维修远海受损舰船的定价博弈

赵瑞嘉^1,2, 谢新连^1,2, 李国栋¹

1.大连海事大学综合运输研究所,辽宁大连 116026;
2.大连海事大学物流研究院,辽宁大连 116026

通讯作者: 谢新连(1956-),男,教授,博导,研究方向:交通运输规划与管理。
作者简介:赵瑞嘉(1993-),男,博士生,研究方向:远海维修保障、定价博弈;李国栋(1993-),男,硕士生,研究方向:交通工程。
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划资助(2017YFC0805309);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(3132019303)

Abstract

Abstract: Repair and support ships could carry out spot maintenance and repair for damaged ships at sea, and would compete with shipyards when entering the maintenance and repair market for ships. In order to solve the optimal pricing problem between repair and support ships and shipyards to repair damaged ships at sea, a pricing game model between repair and support ships and shipyards is established by analyzing the differences in space, time and cost between the repair and support ship modes and shipyard modes. An iterative algorithm is designed to solve this bi-level programming model. Taking a maintenance and repair work of a ship with damaged hulls at sea as an example, the optimal pricing and maximum benefits of repair and support ships and shipyards, and the requirements of ship owners for these two maintenance and repair modes are obtained, which verifies the validity of the model and algorithm. The influence rules of some factors such as dispatch distance, damage degree of ships and difficulty of marine maintenance and repair technology on the pricing of repair and support ships and shipyards is analyzed. This method can provide optimal pricing strategy for operators of repair and support ships and shipyards, and provide theoretical support for pricing game of these two maintenance and repair modes.

Key words: repair and support ships, shipyards, spot maintenance and repair at sea, pricing game

摘要： 维修保障船能够实现远海受损舰船的现场维修,当其进入舰船维修市场时将与修船厂形成一定程度的竞争。为解决维修保障船模式与修船厂模式维修远海受损舰船的最优定价问题,通过分析这两种维修模式在时空以及成本方面的差异,建立维修保障船与修船厂的定价博弈双层规划模型,并设计迭代算法实现模型的求解。以维修远海船体受损的舰船为例,求得了两者的最优定价、最大收益以及船东对两种维修模式的需求,验证了模型与算法的有效性,并分析了调遣距离、舰船受损程度、海上维修技术难度等因素对维修保障船与修船厂定价博弈的影响。该方法能够为维修保障船与修船厂的经营者提供最优定价策略,为两种维修模式的定价博弈提供理论支持。

关键词: 维修保障船, 修船厂, 海上现场维修, 定价博弈

CLC Number:

U672.7

ZHAO Rui-jia, XIE Xin-lian, LI Guo-dong. Pricing Game between Repair and Support Ships and Shipyards for Repairing Damaged Ships at Sea[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(5): 23-29.

赵瑞嘉, 谢新连, 李国栋. 维修保障船与修船厂维修远海受损舰船的定价博弈[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(5): 23-29.

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Pricing Game between Repair and Support Ships and Shipyards for Repairing Damaged Ships at Sea

维修保障船与修船厂维修远海受损舰船的定价博弈

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