Abstract: In this paper, evolutionary game model and system dynamics are combined to explore the decision-making of corporate social responsibility in supply chain under different governance measures. The simulation results show that there is an interaction between the decision-making of enterprises in each link of the supply chain. When one party has a high sense of fulfilling corporate social responsibility the other has a low one. The higher conscious party will eventually tend to fulfill corporate social responsibility regardless of whether there are incentives or not, while the lower one will choose not to fulfill the decision, unless there is a strong incentive. The implementation of incentive measures is more effective for manufacturers when they make decisions on the performance of corporate social responsibility with a neutral attitude. Compared with retailers, manufacturers are more dependent on the market effect brought by consumers' preferences when they fulfill their corporate social responsibilities. Government subsidies are more effective in the short term. The stronger the punishment, the better the incentive effect and the longer the duration. If the two incentive measures are used together, the incentive effect can be better played.

Key words: supply chain corporate social responsibility, evolutionary game, government subsidies, system dynamics, penalty mechanism

摘要： 采用演化博弈模型和系统动力学相结合的方法探讨不同治理措施情景下的供应链企业社会责任决策问题,并进行了仿真分析。结果表明,供应链各环节企业决策之间存在着相互影响作用;当制造商和零售商有一方具有较高的履行企业社会责任意识,另一方具有较低的履行意识时,具有较高意识的一方无论有无激励措施,最终都会趋于履行企业社会责任,而较低一方选择不履行决策,除非有力度较大的激励措施出现;当二者以中性态度对企业社会责任的履行进行决策时,激励措施的实施对制造商更有效;制造商相对于零售商履行企业社会责任,对消费者偏好所带来的市场效应更加依赖;政府补贴在短期内是较为有效的激励方式;惩罚力度越强,激励作用越好,持续时间越久;若两种激励措施搭配使用,可以更好地发挥激励作用。

关键词: 供应链企业社会责任, 演化博弈, 系统动力学, 政府补贴, 惩罚机制