基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0094

运筹与管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 142-151.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2015.0094

基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

史青春, 妥筱楠, 杨慧

兰州大学管理学院,甘肃兰州 730000

收稿日期:2014-06-16 出版日期:2015-06-12
作者简介:史青春(1973-),男,甘肃定西人,博士,讲师,研究方向:创意定价策略,创意管理,舆情管理;妥筱楠(1992-),女,甘肃临夏人,硕士,研究方向:创意管理;杨慧(1989-),女,河南安阳人,硕士,研究方向:舆情管理。
基金资助:
教育部人文社科基金一般项目(13YJC630133);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71302167);兰州大学“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金”(13LZUJBWZY001)

Research on Design of Creative Idea Transaction Contract Based on the Viewpoint of an Informed Principal

SHI Qing-chun, TUO Xiao-nan, YANG Hui

Management school of Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China

Received:2014-06-16 Online:2015-06-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中,与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题,以创意的特性为基础,通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型,证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性,并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现,当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时,分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。

关键词: 创意转化, 信号博弈, 均衡契约, 知识产权, 有信息的委托人

Abstract: In order to formalize the signaling revelation problem facing an informed principal and an agent when they sign a contract in the process of creative idea transaction, this paper demonstrates the separate equilibrium existing in contract of creative idea transaction by establishing a Stackelberg signal game model, which is based on the features of creative idea, and an analysis on the effects that the intellectual property protection environment and the industrial maturity respectively have on the equilibrium contract is also made in this research. It is also found that the separating equilibrium contract makes the agent’s efforts distorted downward when adverse selection of the principal and moral hazard of the agent coexist.

Key words: creative idea transaction, signal game, equilibrium contract, intellectual property, informed principal

中图分类号:

F062.5
G124

史青春, 妥筱楠, 杨慧. 基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(3): 142-151.

SHI Qing-chun, TUO Xiao-nan, YANG Hui. Research on Design of Creative Idea Transaction Contract Based on the Viewpoint of an Informed Principal[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(3): 142-151.

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基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

Research on Design of Creative Idea Transaction Contract Based on the Viewpoint of an Informed Principal

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