关键词: 环境规制, 演化稳定策略, 演化博弈论, 地方政府, 中央政府

Abstract: For the interaction between local government and central government in environmental regulation, the evolutionary process of decision is discussed based on the evolutionary game theory. In this paper, an asymmetric evolutionary game model between local government and central government is established to study the behavioral characteristics of participants in environmental regulation. Behavioral evolutionary law of participants is found out according to the replicator dynamics equation, evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed, and the related influencing factors are also considered. The results show that the evolutionarily stable strategy of local government and central government is affected by the initial states of environmental regulation system, the cost of environmental regulation of local government, the income of environmental regulation of local government, the cost of supervision of central government, the punishment of central government to local government. The implementation of environmental regulation of local government will be promoted by reducing the cost of supervision, strengthening supervision and punishment to local government, reducing the cost of environmental regulation, increasing the income of environmental regulation, which contributes to the improvement of environmental quality.

Key words: environmental regulation, evolutionarily stable strategy, evolutionary game theory, local government, central government