关键词: 闭环供应链, 竞争, 需求扰动, 生产决策, 收入共享契约

Abstract: This paper studies the production and coordination decisions in one-manufacturer-two-competing-retailers closed-loop supply chains when facing demand disruptions. The results indicate that the optimal production quantity and return rate have some robustness, while the optimal selling price always changes with demand disruptions. We also find that the centralized decision-maker, manufacturer and retailer prefer to adjust their decisions when facing considerably positive disruptions; the centralized decision–maker and manufacturer also prefer to adjust their decisions, but the retailer tends to maintain original decisions when facing considerably negative disruptions. The coordination of closed-loop supply chain with/without disruptions can be achieved by revenue-sharing contracts, while more profits are required by retailers under markedly negative disruptions.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, competition, demand disruptions, production decisions, revenue-sharing contract