关键词: RCEP, 跨国科技合作, 演化博弈, 三策略

Abstract: At present, the world is experiencing profound shifts unseen in a century,and human development is facing more and more major challenges. In the context of globalization, scientific and technological innovation is an important means to respond to global challenges, win-win cooperation is the goal of forming a new type of international relations, and international scientific and technological cooperation is an important measure to respond to the global challenges facing mankind. To distinguish the impact of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) on transnational scientific and technological cooperation, study how to promote international scientific and technological cooperation, accelerate the process of scientific and technological innovation, and enable RCEP member states to benefit from the experience and technological advantages from other member states to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results, work together to build a global scientific and technological community are crucial.
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, a three-strategy scientific and technological cooperation evolutionary game model is constructed and a dynamic replication equation is established. Moreover, this paper uses real data from each RCEP member state in 2019 to conduct a comparative study on the evolution paths and stabilization strategies of scientific and technological cooperation between China and other RCEP member states with or without RCEP, analyzes the impact of RCEP on transnational scientific and technological cooperation, explores the main factors affecting behavior, and then provides policy suggestions to promote RCEP to maximize its effect.
The research results show that RCEP can promote scientific and technological cooperation between China and other countries, but for countries with a higher degree of cooperation, its signing means more “free-riding” opportunities, in terms of the impact of RCEP on China, It is said that after signing RCEP, due to the deepening of cooperation and the reduction in monitoring costs, China and other member states will transform their full cooperation strategy into a bullying strategy to obtain “free-riding” benefits. Therefore, this paper recommends the introduction of a third-party regulatory agency to strictly supervise the cooperation between member states, to strongly combat opportunism in the game process, to introduce punishment factors, to increase the crackdown on “free-riding” behavior, and to crack down on “free-riding” behavior. Different countries adopt different penalties and control the intensity of punishment. Based on not affecting the willingness of member states to cooperate in science and technology, the maximum intensity of punishment to warn other countries is chosen.

Key words: RCEP, transnational scientific and technological cooperation, evolutionary game, three strategies