关键词: 创业投资, 政府补贴, 实物期权

Abstract: Innovation is a source power of a country’s economic development and an important force to push forward the economy and society. Compared with the huge investment in R&D funds, China’s actual industrial technology level and key core competitiveness have not achieved sufficient development yet. Although the government attaches unprecedented importance to the innovation capability of enterprises, due to the limitation of external factors and objective laws, it is impossible for the investment of national financial funds to grow rapidly without boundaries. Therefore, both the government and enterprises should gradually change the focus of their work and pay more attention to the efficiency of subsidizing units.
As far as the current mainstream subsidy policies around the world are concerned, there are no more than three main forms of subsidy. That is, the subsidy policy for start-ups represented by the Small Business Administration (SBA) of the United States, the subsidy policy for venture capital institutions by the YOZMA program of Israel, and the subsidy policy for both start-ups and venture capital institutions by the German Central Government Guidance Fund. However, there is still no accurate conclusion on what form of subsidy policy can promote the development of start-ups to the greatest extent. Therefore, the optimal subsidy policy and pricing for start-ups with the government have become the focus issues that need to be solved in the process of promoting the development of innovative economy.
Different from previous studies, this paper summarizes and puts forward three different types of subsidy policies on the basis of previous studies and cases. Taking the venture capital project valuation as an opportunity, this paper focuses on the government subsidy and equity negotiation process in the venture capital process, takes the difference of the negotiation ability between the enterprise and the capital into account and uses the real option pricing theory in the continuous time framework to model and solve the above problems. This paper holds a meaningful discussion on the influence of different subsidy types and equity negotiation process on the critical value of both enterprises and investors and the investment value of projects, which to some extent fills a theoretical gap between subsidy policy and entrepreneurial project pricing.
The findings of this paper are as follows: (1)The investment value of the same investment project varies greatly due to different subsidy policies. (2)The critical value of both enterprises and investors is negatively correlated with their respective equity shares. The ideal equity negotiation of both parties can satisfy the participation constraints of their respective critical values under certain conditions, so as to maintain the overall process of venture capital investment. However, the difference in negotiating ability of both parties will lead to the artificial distortion of the original subsidy target. (3)For start-ups, project investment value is positively correlated with equity share. For venture capitalists, the project investment value presents an inverted U shape with an increase in equity share, which means that there is an optimal equity allocation scheme between the enterprise and the capital in the process of venture capital, which maximizes the project investment value.

Key words: venture capital, funding policies, real option