关键词: 需求信息不对称, 军民两用国防专利, 许可定价, 持股

Abstract: The transfer of dual-use defense patents from military to civilian fields has been increasingly regarded as the key path to deep integration of both military and civilian fields. In the context of the rapid development of high-tech technologies and products, it is even harder to predict the demand market. Based on the sensitivity difference of market demand information between military and civilian fields, the asymmetry of information between the two sides has arisen.Only by adopting different license methods for different demand markets can military research institutions distinguish between different types of demand markets, avoid false reporting of demand information by civilian manufacturers, and ensure sustainable and reasonable income. This can also enhance the source of motivation for military research institutions to transfer dual-use defense patents, and promote the virtuous cycle of the entire dual-use defense patent license industry.
Under the background of asymmetric demand information between military defense patent owners and civilian manufacturers, the military research institutes license the declassified defense patents to civilian manufacturers. In the mass market and opportunity market, the military licenses the national defense patents to the civilian manufacturer with three licensing modes: equity participation, equity-royalty and equity-royalty-fixed fee, respectively. Three kinds of licensing pricing strategy information screening game models are constructed, and the influence of these three licensing pricing strategies on the military research institute and civilian manufacturer is compared and analyzed. Besides, we also analyze the impact of each licensing pricing strategy choice on both the military research institutes and civilian manufacturers.
It is found that under the condition of asymmetric demand information, the technology licensing pricing method of equity will only lead to the civilian manufacturer’ misrepresentation about the market demand information, and the military research institute will suffer from failure to obtain effective demand information from the civilian manufacturer; although the equity-royalty strategy in the technology licensing mode will lead to the distortion of production quantity and profit of the civilian manufacturer, it can make the military research institute obtain more market demand information from the civilian manufacturer, and reduce the false information of the civilian manufacturer in order to obtain a larger profit share. At the same time, when the military thinks that the market demand is a mass market, the royalty strategy reduces the probability of opportunity market being excluded, thus reducing the loss caused by information asymmetry; the technology licensing method of equity-royalty is better than that of equity-royalty-fixed fee licensing pricing strategy, because fixed fee licensing strategy increases the probability of opportunity market being excluded, thus increasing the loss caused by information asymmetry.
Firstly, in practice, with the marketization of defense patent licensing, military research institutions may choose to license the defense patents to two or more third-party manufacturers, which may lead to more complex and intense price competition in the market. Therefore, in future research, military research institutions need to make real-time adjustments to the optimal licensing pricing strategy based on the situation of the transferee and market competition. Secondly, with the development of defense patent licensing pricing practices and theories, there will be more models for defense patent licensing pricing, pledge financing, milestone payment, buyout license, and technology auction. Therefore, more licensing pricing models should be explored based on practice.

Key words: information asymmetry, dual-use defense patent, licensing pricing, equity