关键词: 新能源汽车, 技术协同创新, 微分博弈, HJB方程

Abstract: Green and sustainable development has become the theme of global economic development, and the State Council promulgates products “Made in China 2025”, which clearly positions “green development” and “innovation-driven” as the basic policy for the future development of China's manufacturing industry.As an important field of China's green industry development, the new energy vehicles (NEVs) industry is also developing rapidly in line with the trend of the times.In a new scientific and technological change in the background, the integration of Internet technology with NEVs technology, and automobile manufacturing with automobile “intelligence” to promote NEVs industry to complete the transformation and upgrading has become an inevitable trend. Due to the difficulty of automotive smart chip technology research and development and rapid replacement, the existing cooperation model cannot promote the NEVs enterprises and Internet companies to carry out optimal cooperation. Therefore, it is urgent and important to study the optimal cooperation mechanism of technological co-innovation between Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises to enhance the international core competitiveness of China's NEVs and establish a latecomer's advantage. Although existing studies have carried out in-depth research on R&D and innovation in the NEVs industry, the new issue of collaborative R&D and innovation between Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises has rarely been addressed, and the coordination of interests among the main subjects of collaborative innovation has been neglected.
Therefore, aiming at the problem of technology collaborative innovation between Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises, this paper takes Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises as the research object, and constructs a differential game model. The HJB equation is used to analyze the optimal R&D efforts of Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises, the optimal technology collaborative innovation subsidies of Internet enterprises to NEVs enterprises and the optimal cooperation mode of the two enterprises under three cooperative technology innovation game situations. Through the comparative analysis of the three game conclusions, it is found that: (1)The subsidies of Internet enterprises to NEVs enterprises are negatively correlated with the income distribution coefficient. (2)The research and development investment of NEVs enterprises is more effective than that of Internet enterprises in improving the overall revenue. (3)Efforts made by Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises for technological breakthroughs of NEVs can maximize the overall benefits of the R&D cooperation between the two sides. (4)In Stackelberg master-slave mode, Internet companies and NEVs enterprises' respective R&D efforts, R&D revenues and total R&D revenues are superior to those in Nash non-cooperation mode, reaching Pareto equilibrium. (5)In the collaborative cooperation mode, Internet enterprises and NEVs enterprises are the best among the three modes in terms of their respective R&D efforts, R&D earnings and total R&D earnings, and a perfect Pareto equilibrium is achieved.
Finally, this paper verifies the correctness of the theoretical results through the analysis of numerical examples and puts forward corresponding suggestions based on the conclusions, with a view to providing references for Chinese government to promote the synergistic technological cooperation between NEVs enterprises and Internet enterprises. Specifically, firstly, different modes of co-innovation cooperation should be vigorously carried out; Secondly, Internet enterprises should shoulder more responsibility as well as share the cost of co-innovation R&D; Then, basic R&D investment in NEVs should be increased; And lastly, deeper technological co-innovation cooperation should be carried out.

Key words: NEVs, technological collaborative innovation, differential game, HJB equation