关键词: 防疫投机, 长效监管, 从众偏好, 演化博弈

Abstract: During the regular control of the epidemic, regional and aggregated epidemics with airports, ports and scenic restaurants as the source have emerged. This indicates that there are difficulties in implementing epidemic prevention at the enterprise level, among which epidemic prevention speculation is an important reason. Theoretical and practical experience proves that effective government regulation can reduce the probability of corporate speculation, but the effectiveness of regulation is affected by a variety of factors such as regulatory approach and benefits. Long-term effective regulation requires flexible selection of efficient regulatory approaches according to environmental changes, which manifests as behavioral interactions between firms and regulatory groups. Moreover, empirical studies point out the prevalence of conformity behavior in public crisis response, which manifests as behavioral interactions within the respective groups of enterprises or regulators. This paper integrates the perspective of intra-group and inter-group behavioral interactions and considers conformity preferences to study the problem of corporate anti-speculation and government regulatory approach selection. It remedies the shortcomings of existing studies in analyzing this issue from a single perspective and provides a basis for relevant management practices.
The article uses the evolutionary game approach to analyze the problem of corporate epidemic prevention speculation and government regulation choice in the process of normalized epidemic prevention, and introduces a conformity utility function to improve the game benefit matrix. It is assumed that there is a conformity preference in the process of both corporate epidemic prevention and government regulation strategy selection, and the strategy value includes two parts: Gain utility and herding utility. According to the results of evolutionary stability analysis, five critical value functions are proposed to analyze the role and conditions of the influence of revenue and strategy factors on the evolution of both parties' behaviors under the interaction of situational factors.
The study results show that a) the conformity preference of corporate and government could promote the impact of initial strategies of both sides on speculation in epidemic prevention, and b)the decrease of corporate conformity preference or the aggravation of epidemic severity could promote the impact of epidemic prevention cost differential and speculation fines and epidemic prevention losses differential on speculation. When the above conditions are met, enterprises' speculation in epidemic prevention could be curbed by raising the initial proportion of enterprises with strict prevention strategies, reducing the epidemic prevention cost differential, and raising speculation fines or epidemic prevention losses differential. In that case, “result-based regulation” is the efficient regulation method. It is also found that increasing the initial proportion of “process-based regulation” could curb corporate speculative behavior and became the efficient regulatory way.
The article has enriched the research perspective of analyzing the problem of corporate speculation and government regulation, but there are some limitations. In-depth research can be conducted in the future from the following aspects. Firstly, this study is theoretical in nature and lacks empirical confirmation. In the future, the findings of this study can be empirically tested by collecting and organizing relevant data. Secondly, the structure of group networks and relationship boundaries are not considered in the construction of the conformity utility model, and the social network modeling technique can be used to optimize the conformity preference utility model in the future.

Key words: speculation in epidemic prevention, long-term effective regulation, conformity preference, evolutionary game