关键词: 石油, 开采政策, 非对称Nash谈判, 序贯均衡

Abstract: Oil plays an inestimable role in safeguarding national economic and social development as well as national defense security. According to the International Energy Agency, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) supplied 41% of the world's oil in 2020. Therefore, the developing countries play a pivotal role in oil supply. However, due to the backward technology of developing countries, they often delegate the task of oil extraction to enterprises in other countries. It is worth noting that the oil extraction companies have caused severely environmental pollution problems by extracting oil from the ground. On the other hand, the environmental groups oppose oil extraction in order to promote local environmental protection, which is the opposite of the motives of the oil extracting companies. Therefore, the oil extraction companies and the environmental organizations from the developed countries have a significant influence on the oil extraction policies of the government in the developing countries. In other words, it is of importantly practical significance to explore the three oil extraction strategies. The extant literature on oil extraction argues that the government of the developing countries should cooperate with the oil extraction companies from the developed countries to exploit domestic oil, but should not get involved in the influences of the oil extraction companies and the environmental organizations on the oil extraction policies of governments in the developing countries. Although Grossman and Helpman proposed a co-agent model of lobbying based on dual motives of government to maximize social welfare and lobby group payment, studying the influence of companies or environmental groups on government decisions, there is no subordination relationship between foreign companies or environmental protection organizations and the government of developing countries, which causes the oil extraction companies or the environmental organizations from the developed countries to have certain bargaining power in negotiations with the governments of the developing countries. Therefore, this paper uses asymmetry Nash bargaining game to investigate the government's oil extraction decisions in the developing countries.
Notably, the oil extraction companies and the environmental groups negotiate with governments (who may be affected by the payoffs). The government,which only seeks to maximize social welfare, is likely to get more investment, while the government, which is not interested in social welfare, is more likely to be persuaded by direct monetary payments. For this reason, government will assess the fees paid by lobby groups (including the oil extraction companies and the environmental groups). The environmental groups would rather prefer small reductions in the oil extraction than large reductions in trilateral negotiations, since the latter are more expensive. On the other hand, the government can not only set the oil extraction policies, but also decide whether to invite both an oil extraction company and an environmental group to perform the trilateral negotiation, or to invite one of them to perform the bilateral negotiation. If the tripartite negotiations break down, the government can choose one of both parties to negotiate bilaterally. If the bilateral negotiation fails, the government will negotiate bilaterally with the other one. When the negotiation breaks down, the government will choose a social welfare maximization strategy. In view of this, this paper constructs a sequential asymmetric Nash bargaining game model with a government in a developing country, an environmental organization and an oil extraction company from the developed countries, where the government faces pressure or bribery an environmental organization and an oil extraction company and the environmental organization tends to reduce production in a small range in trilateral negotiations. The government selects the negotiation order by sequential optimization method, and the negotiation parties predict the negotiation order by backward induction method. The sequential asymmetric Nash bargaining solution effectively solves the problem that “no externality is allowed and unilateral actions are ineffective”.
The results of this paper are mainly divided into the following three aspects: First, in the tripartite bargaining game a lobby has a stronger impact on government decision-making if the cost of raising funds for a lobby is low or if the government pays more attention to this lobby's payments; Second, the lobby (who would still have impact after a breakdown of the tripartite negotiation) pays lower payments in the equilibrium for the trilateral bargaining game than that in the equilibrium for the bilateral bargaining game; Third, it is shown that the environmental protection organization may benefit from its behavior of maintaining the tripartite negotiation if there is no conflict of interest between this organization and the government.
Our analysis provides some interesting managerial insights: If the profit of the oil extraction companyis high, the ability of the environmental organization to pay the government is limited, the government has nothing to do but cooperate with the oil extraction company. Therefore, strengthening bilateral cooperation is not conducive to environmental protection. In this case, the tripartite negotiation can at least reduce oil extraction to a certain extent, which is conducive to reducing environmental pollution. Future research could further consider how emergencies, such as COVID-19 or a change of government, affect collaboration between lobbies with conflicting interests.

Key words: oil, extraction policy, asymmetry Nash bargaining, sequential equilibrium