运筹与管理 ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (4): 198-204.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2023.0135

• 应用研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

互联网金融创新与监管并行策略研究

吕秀梅   

  1. 重庆工商大学 金融学院,重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2019-01-17 出版日期:2023-04-25 发布日期:2023-06-07
  • 作者简介:吕秀梅(1978-),女,四川德阳人,教授,博士,研究方向:互联网金融,金融科技。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(19XYJ022);重庆工商大学2021-2022重点科研平台开放课题(KFJJ2022044)

Parallel Strategy between Innovation and Supervision on Internet Finance

LYU Xiumei   

  1. School of Finance, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2019-01-17 Online:2023-04-25 Published:2023-06-07

摘要: 运用演化动态博弈方法分析互联网金融创新与监管间的动态博弈,推演出并行策略演化路径,并通过仿真模拟进行实证检验。研究表明,互金企业创新意愿与创新收益、监管成本正相关,与创新成本和可能罚金呈正态分布关系;监管部门监管意愿与罚金、监管额外收益正相关,与创新收益负相关,与监管成本呈正态分布关系;创新成本对监管部门的监管策略没有影响,但与监管部门非监管策略的概率负相关。因此,互金企业应以合规为前提,通过技术、模式及产品的创新提高创新收益,通过多样化营销渠道降低创新成本;监管部门可通过监管科技来降低监管成本,且在互金企业创新意愿不强时采取多种措施来刺激或鼓励创新。该研究有助于厘清互联网金融中互金企业创新与监管机构之间的激励约束,为促进互联网金融健康发展提供更多理论支撑和政策启示。

关键词: 互联网金融, 创新, 监管, 并行策略

Abstract: Innovation is a major feature of Internet finance. It can not only reduce information asymmetry, improve financial efficiency, but also better guide financial resources to develop inclusive finance and serve the real economy. However, Internet finance corporations may innovate in order to get rid of financial regulatory constraints. If regulatory authorities can supervise timely and effectively, regulatory arbitrage and illegal acts will be avoided. There exists a dynamic closed-loop game “supervision and innovation” between regulatory authorities and Internet finance corporations. Whether the supervision is excessive or insufficient, it is bound to inhibit Internet financial innovation. Only moderate supervision can provide a favorable environment for financial innovation. However, the existing literature rarely deals with the dynamic game between Internet financial innovation and supervision, and rarely analyzes the game balance between these two important participants. Therefore, the paper analyzes the impact of various factors on the strategic game with innovation and regulation and deduces the possible parallel strategic path. The paper can enrich the relevant research on the innovation and supervision of Internet finance, help clarify the incentives and constraints between the innovation of corporations and regulators, and provide more theoretical support and policy inspiration for promoting the healthy development of Internet finance.
Using the evolutionary dynamic game method, the paper establishes a dynamic game model between the innovation and supervision of Internet finance and derives the evolutionary path of parallel strategy. Firstly, we consider the different conditions of whether Internet finance corporations and regulatory authorities participate in the game or not, and then obtain the income matrix of the game between them. Secondly, the replication dynamic equations for Internet finance corporations and regulatory authorities are deduced, respectively, by which the parallel strategy is discussed for these two parties under different conditions. Thirdly, the parallel strategy is simulated by Matlab to test the interpretation capacity of the game model in the real life. Finally, relevant conclusions and suggestions are presented.
The research shows that innovation willingness of Internet finance corporates is positively related to the innovation income and the supervision cost. The innovation probability presents a normal distribution relation with the innovation cost and the innovation penalty that may be paid by Internet finance corporations because of violating rule or law. The regulatory willingness of the regulatory authorities is positively related to the possible innovation penalty and the extra regulatory income. The regulatory probability presents a normal distribution with the regulatory cost. Only when the net income of supervision exceeds the regulatory cost can the regulatory authorities be driven to supervise the innovative financial business of Internet finance corporations. Only when the innovation income of Internet finance corporations exceeds the innovation cost and the possible penalty can these corporates have the motivation for innovation. In addition, the cost of innovation has no effect on the regulatory strategy of the regulatory authorities, but it is negatively correlated to the probability of non-regulatory strategy of the regulatory authorities. Therefore, Internet finance corporations should take compliance as the premise, improve their innovation income through method innovation, model innovation, product innovation, etc., and reduce innovation cost through FinTech and diversified marketing channel innovation. Regulatory authorities need to reduce regulatory cost through innovating SupTech, optimizing supervision business on internet finance and communicating well with corporates. It is also necessary to take various measures to stimulate and encourage innovation when Internet finance corporations are not willing to innovate.
Internet finance is known as FinTech 2.0, which makes China’s finance grow explosively based on logic and channels innovation. In the development of FinTech, SupTech, which means “standardizing science and technology with science and technology”, is gradually split up from FinTech. Therefore, further research can focus on the parallel strategy between FinTech and SupTech. Specifically, we need to study the game strategy of the micro entities that participate in FinTech and SupTech innovation, analyze the impact of their benefits and costs on the choice of game strategy, and propose incentives to promote financial institutions and regulatory authorities to cooperate in the innovative development of FinTech and SupTech.

Key words: Internet finance, innovation, supervision, parallel strategy

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