关键词: 渠道溢出效应, 在线渠道, 协调机制

Abstract: Considering the reality of limited audience for manufacturer-owned channels, the spillover effect that can increase the audience of manufacturer-owned channel of E-business platform was introduced into an online channel model which is constituted by a manufacturer and an E-business platform which sales its own products. The problems of optimal decision making were analyzed in three scenarios. The first scenario is that the manufacturer does not enter E-business platform, the second one is that the manufacturer enters this platform and establishes its own online channel, the last one is that the manufacturer enters this platform but does not establish its own online channel. The results show that the realization of manufacturer’s optimal profit will be effected by consumers’ preference on the products selling on manufacturer’s own channel. And, if the manufacturer enters the platform, centralized decision will get more whole channel profit than decentralized decision whether manufacturer establishes its own online channel or not. But the channel will get more whole profit when the manufacturer does not enter the platform than enters the platform if the spillover effect of E-business platform is relatively high and the consumers’ preference on the product of manufacturer’s own channel is relatively small. At last, different coordination mechanisms are designed for different online channel structures according to the referral fee rate of E-business platform, which makes the online channel achieves Pareto improvement.

Key words: spillover effect of channel, online channel, coordination mechanism