关键词: 闭环供应链, 零售商主导, 微分博弈, 奖惩机制

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic equilibrium strategy of the members in a retailer-dominated closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under reward-penalty mechanism (RPM). The manufacturer collects waste products and conducts re-manufacturing and the recovery rate changes dynamically with time. We construct three Stackelberg differential game models: the government does not impose RPM on the manufacturer or the retailer, the government imposes RPM on the manufacturer separately and the government imposes RPM on both the manufacturer and the retailer. By using the Bellman's continuous dynamic planning theory, we obtain the decision equilibrium results under these three models and make a comparative analysis. We prove the effectiveness of PRM for the members of CLSC. Finally, we us numerical examples to analyze the Steady-state and unsteady-state conditions of CLSC. The results show that the RPM can correctly guide the members of CLSC to make optimal decisions, which can effectively reduce the double marginal effect of the CLSC and improve the consumer surplus. When the retailer shares the responsibility for recycling, it will reduce the government's incentive for manufacturers to recycle and reduce the overall profit of CLSC. In contrast, the RPM imposed on the manufacturer separately is the optimal pattern, which can improve the performance of economy and environmental protection.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, retailer-dominated, differential game, reward-penalty mechanism