关键词: PPP项目, 控制权, 风险偏好, 激励规制效应, 合作行为

Abstract: To effectively motivate or regulate the cooperative behavior of private sector, this study considers the risk preference of private sector when analyzing the issue of the control rights allocation for PPP projects, and then establishes the expected utility function of bounded rationality to propose the dynamic adjustment principle of control rights for private sector under the portfolios of different risk preference. The results indicate that in the case of the risk-neutral government, when the private sector is risk aversion, there is the minimum motivation threshold for the control right share, which is negatively related to the risk-averse degree. The findings illustrate the achievement of the regulation effect for control rights under the premise of motivation. When the private sector is risk-seeking, there is a maximum regulation threshold for the control right share, which is positively related to the risk-seeking degree. The findings elucidate the realization of the motivation effect for control rights under the premise of regulation. Besides, the outputs of the government are negatively associated with the risk-averse degree and the control right share of private sector, but positively associated with the risk-seeking degree of private sector. Finally, based on the different risk preference portfolios, this research further applies the numerical analysis to demonstrate the incentive and regulatory effects of private sector's control right share on their cooperative behavior, and the impacts on the outputs of the government.

Key words: PPP projects, control rights, risk preference, the effects of motivation and regulation, cooperative behavior