基于促销和延保的渠道入侵与订货时序策略

doi:10.12005/orms.2022.0045

运筹与管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (2): 70-76.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0045

基于促销和延保的渠道入侵与订货时序策略

刘震, 经有国, 申诗谣

昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明 650093

收稿日期:2020-03-19 出版日期:2022-02-25 发布日期:2022-03-11
通讯作者: 经有国(1981-),男,广西桂林,教授,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理
作者简介:刘震(1994-),男,河南新乡,硕士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理;申诗谣(1995-),女,四川绵阳,硕士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461014,71861020,72163018);教育部人文社会科学资助项目(21YJC630049,18YJA630089);云南省基础研究计划资助项目(2019FB087);云南省哲学社会科学研究基地资助项目(JD2018YB11)

Manufacturer Encroachment and Order Timing Strategy with Promotion and Extended Warranty Services

LIU Zhen, JING You-guo, SHEN Shi-yao

Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China

Received:2020-03-19 Online:2022-02-25 Published:2022-03-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级供应链,制造商一方面考虑是否开拓电子商务市场而建立直销渠道与零售商展开渠道竞争,另一方面为刺激市场需求开展促销活动并对所有消费者提供有偿延保服务。分别针对先后订货和同时订货两种情形,刻画了不同入侵成本下制造商的最优入侵、促销、定价以及销售策略,并分析了制造商渠道入侵策略对零售商订货决策和盈利能力的影响。研究表明:满足入侵成本阈值条件时,渠道入侵有利于改善制造商利润;同时订货会降低制造商的入侵动机和零售商利润;在延保服务价格敏感系数和促销成本系数满足相关约束时,零售商能够从制造商渠道入侵中攫取更多利润,实现供应链节点企业的互利共赢;无论订货时序如何,渠道入侵总会提高促销努力水平和延保服务价格。

关键词: 供应链, 促销投资, 延保服务, 渠道入侵

Abstract: Considering the two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and retailer, on the one hand, the manufacturer considers whether to open up the e-commerce market and establish direct channel to compete with retailer. On the other hand, the manufacturer carries out promotional activities to stimulate market demand and provide extended warranty services to all consumers. For the two cases of sequential ordering and simultaneous ordering, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer under different entry cost are described, and the manufacturer encroachment strategy on retailers' order decisions and profitability are analyzed. The research shows that channel encroachment can improve the profit of manufacturer when the threshold condition of entry cost is satisfied. Ordering at the same time will reduce manufacturer's encroachment motivation and retailer's profit. When the price sensitive coefficient and promotion cost coefficient meet the relevant constraints, the retailer can gain more profits from the manufacturer encroachment, and can achieve win-win with the manufacturer. Regardless of order timing, the manufacture encroachment will always improve the level of promotion efforts and the price of extended warranty services.

Key words: supply chain, promotion investment, extended warranty, manufacture encroachment

中图分类号:

C391

刘震, 经有国, 申诗谣. 基于促销和延保的渠道入侵与订货时序策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(2): 70-76.

LIU Zhen, JING You-guo, SHEN Shi-yao. Manufacturer Encroachment and Order Timing Strategy with Promotion and Extended Warranty Services[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(2): 70-76.

参考文献

[1] 搜狐网.家电双雄:从线上数据看美的格力的增长前景[EB/OL].(2018-04-24)[2020.7.13]. https://www.sohu.com/a/229478284_649823.
[2] Yang H, Luo J, Zhang Q. Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: bargaining power versus revenue-sharing[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 267(3): 1089-1101.
[3] Arya A, Mittendorf B, Sappington D E M. The bright side of supplier encroachment[J]. Marketing Science, 2007, 26(5): 651-659.
[4] Mittendorf B, Shin J,Yoon D H. Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economics,2013, 11(2): 263-287.
[5] Li Z, Gilbert S M, Lai G. Supplier encroachment under asymmetric information[J]. Management science, 2014, 60(2): 449-462.
[6] Li Z, Gilbert S M, Lai G. Supplier encroachment as an enhancement or a hindrance to nonlinear pricing[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(1): 89-109.
[7] Zhang S, Zhang J, Zhu G, et al. Retail service investing: an anti-encroachment strategy in a retailer-led supply chain[J]. Omega-international Journal of Management Science, 2019, 84: 212-231.
[8] Guan X, Liu B, Chen Y, et al. Inducing supply chain transparency through supplier encroachment[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2020, 29(3): 725-749.
[9] Huang S, Guan X, Chen Y J. Retailer information sharing with supplier encroachment[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2018, 27(6): 1133-1147.
[10] 计国君,王东,Kim Hua TAN.基于双渠道环境下在位制造商的阻止策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2018,38(09):2230-2241.
[11] Ha A, Long X, Nasiry J. Quality in supply chain encroachment[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2015, 18(2): 280-298.
[12] Yoon D H. Supplier encroachment and investment spillovers[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2016, 25(11): 1839-1854.
[13] Li T, Xie J, Zhao X. Supplier encroachment in competitive supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 165: 120-131.
[14] 金亮,郭萌.不同权力结构下品牌差异化制造商市场入侵的影响研究[J].管理学报,2018,15(1):135-143.
[15] 郑本荣,杨超,杨珺,等.产品再制造、渠道竞争和制造商渠道入侵[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(8):103-116.
[16] 郑本荣,杨超,杨珺.回收模式对制造商渠道入侵策略的影响[J].管理科学,2019,32(3):92-105.
[17] 马建华,艾兴政,赵海霞,等.基于零售商延保服务的竞争供应链销售回扣合同[J].系统工程学报,2018(4):520-535.
[18] 马建华,艾兴政,唐小我.基于延保服务的竞争供应链纵向渠道结构选择[J].系统工程学报,2015,30(4):539-553.
[19] 郑晨,艾兴政,李晓静,等.竞争零售商的供应链延保服务两部定价合同选择[J].系统工程学报,2018,33(5):674-686.
[20] Ma J, Ai X, Yang W, et al. Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers' extended warranties[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2019, 275(2): 485-510.
[21] 艾兴政,张越,李晓静,等.延保服务的供应链收益共享合同选择[J].系统工程学报,2018,33(4):500-510.
[22] Li K, Mallik S, Chhajed D. Design of extended warranties in supply chains under additive demand[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(4): 730-746.
[23] Bian Y, Xie J, Archibald T W, et al. Optimal extended warranty strategy: offering trade-in service or not?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2019, 278(1): 240-254.
[24] Zheng B, Bian Y, Sun Y, et al. Optimal extended warranty strategy: uniform or nonuniform pricing?[J]. International Transactions in Operational Research, 2018.(Publish online)
[25] 易余胤,张永华,姚俊江.考虑网络外部性和渠道权力结构的供应链延保服务模式研究[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(3):92-104.
[26] Taylor T A. Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(8): 992-1007.
[27] Pang Q, Chen Y, Hu Y. Coordinating three-level supply chain by revenue-sharing contract with sales effort dependent demand[J]. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2014, 10(1): 1-10.
[28] 林晶,王健,郑敏.买方抗衡势力下双渠道促销合作微分博弈研究[J].中国管理科学,2019,27(9):80-92.
[29] 陈晓春,张文松,顾维军.考虑促销行为和消费者偏好的医药供应链协调研究[J].工业工程与管理,2019,24(6):24-33,42.
[30] 蒋雨珊,李波.店中店还是转卖?促销努力下制造商入侵策略选择[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(9):181-189.

基于促销和延保的渠道入侵与订货时序策略

Manufacturer Encroachment and Order Timing Strategy with Promotion and Extended Warranty Services

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

[1]	何杜博, 黄栋. 基于改进EAHP的装备采购供应链质量绩效评价[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(2): 148-154.
[2]	孙立成, 应梦煌, 张济建. 碳转移与消费者低碳偏好双重影响下供应链异质性产品定价与协调研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(2): 155-161.
[3]	侯剑, 白雪斌, 华连连. 考虑隐性股权的电商供应链融资模式研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(2): 178-183.
[4]	王先甲, 顾翠伶, 何奇龙, 赵金华. 供应链金融信贷市场三方演化博弈动态[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(1): 30-37.
[5]	田春英, 陈东彦, 陈兆波, 章定. 存在破产成本时保理授信下供应商赊销策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(1): 115-122.
[6]	吴志樵, 牛宇超, 康亚玲, 唐加福. 考虑水资源税下的电厂与电网之间双重边际效应模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(1): 142-148.
[7]	胥丽莉, 孙杰, 李欣怡. 基于公路运力信用结构的供应链金融授信分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(1): 162-168.
[8]	谭春桥, 吴欣, 周丽. 考虑公平关切的O2O模式下物流服务供应链定价策略博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 80-85.
[9]	徐琪, 吴翠, 陈啟. 共享平台下供应链闲置资源动态优化配置策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 86-92.
[10]	曹晓宁, 刘晓冰. 权力结构影响下考虑预售的双渠道供应链决策研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 93-99.
[11]	闻卉, 王先甲, 陶建平, 曹晓刚. 零售商合作偏好下生鲜农产品供应链的政府补贴机制与优化策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 100-106.
[12]	孙广磊, 李小申, 尚有林. 时变需求等量进货情形下集成供应链生产订货策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 107-112.
[13]	师苑, 王新华, 高红伟. 三级供应链企业间交叉持股时均衡定价及市场绩效研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 145-151.
[14]	叶飞, 谢泽飞, 蔡子功. 随机产出与需求下农户融资模式选择研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 187-193.
[15]	张天瑞, 魏铭琦, 高秀秀, 王淑梅. 基于交互式模糊规划方法的可持续闭环供应链网络规划[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(8): 81-86.