关键词: 地震保险, 演化博弈, 政府干预, 慈善风险

Abstract: The funding arrangements for responding to earthquake risks in China can be divided into pre-disaster preventive nature and post-disaster payout nature according to ex-ante and ex-post. How should the government allocate disaster relief funds under a certain unanticipated budget? What are the implications for earthquake insurance market equilibrium? This paper constructs a three-way evolutionary game model and finds that moderate post-disaster relief by the government can ensure both efficiency and equity, while excessive post-disaster relief will raise residents' disaster relief expectations in the long run and inhibit the formation and improvement of the commercial earthquake insurance market. Meanwhile, guiding and improving social risk management awareness and risk perception are also key to improving the efficiency of earthquake insurance market.

Key words: earthquake insurance, evolutionary game, government intervention, charity hazard