关键词: 演化博弈, 地方政府, 稀土企业, 数值仿真

Abstract: In view of the complexity of environmental governance in rare earth mining areas, this paper establishes a dynamic evolutionary game model between local governments and rare earth enterprises, analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies and influencing factors of both parties in different situations, and carries out numerical simulation with MATLAB. The research shows that the regulatory cost of local governments, the reward and punishment policies for rare earth enterprises when implementing environmental regulations, the pollution control cost of rare earth enterprises and the additional income during illegal mining would affect the evolutionary stability strategy of local governments and rare earth enterprises, and reduce the regulatory cost of local governments The pollution control cost of rare earth enterprises would guide the evolutionary stability strategy of both sides of the game to {strict supervision and legal mining}, so as to promote the sustainable development of the mining area environment.

Key words: evolutionary game, local government, mining enterprises, numerical simulation