运筹与管理 ›› 2011, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (6): 33-38.

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于供应商视角的提前订货协调研究

钟远光, 周永务, 郭金森   

  1. 华南理工大学 工商管理学院, 广东 广州 510640
  • 收稿日期:2010-06-09 出版日期:2011-12-25
  • 作者简介:周永务(1964-),男,安徽庐江人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为物流与供应链管理,库存控制;钟远光(1984-),男,福建龙岩人,博士生,研究方向为提前订货协调研究;郭金森(1986-),男,河南新乡人,硕士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点项目(71131003);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971041;71072165);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(10151064101000000);教育部博士点基金项目(20100172110032)

Supply Chain Coordination Model with Advance Booking Discounts Program

ZHONG Yuan-guang, ZHOU Yong-wu, GUO Jin-sen   

  1. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 540640, China
  • Received:2010-06-09 Online:2011-12-25

摘要: 本文针对一个供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,主要研究零售商如何设计提前订货折扣来吸引顾客提前订货;而供应商如何根据市场需求的不确定性,设计零售商提前订货资金的付款时间等问题。在供应商-Stackelberg框架下,以期望利润为目标,建立了相应的决策模型。通过对模型的分析求解,给出了不同市场环境下供应商要求零售商支付提前订货资金的策略。最后,用算例验证了模型和理论分析的可行性。

关键词: 供应链管理, 提前订货折扣, 延期支付, Stackelberg 博弈

Abstract: We consider a supply chain that consists of a supplier and a retailer, selling a single product to the customers over a short selling season. In this paper, we mainly research how the retailer uses the ABD program to entice customers to pre-commit their orders and how the supplier designs the payment plan so as to maximize his/her own expected profit. Under the supplier-Stackelberg game, the paper gets the decision models based on the object of expected profit. Solving the models, we have got the optimal solutions and obtained some effective theorems. Finally, we provide a detailed numerical example to illustrate the model and the theoretical analysis.

Key words: supply chain management, advance booking discounts, delay in payment, Stackelberg game

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